



EUTF Monitoring and Learning System SLC

S1 2024 REPORT

COVERING UNTIL 30 JUNE 2024

Altai Consulting for the European Union – December 2024



Funded by
the European Union



© 2024 Altai Consulting. All rights reserved.

Licensed to the European Union under conditions.

Unless specified otherwise, all photos in this report are credited to Altai Consulting.

This publication was produced with the financial support of the European Union through the European Union Emergency Trust Fund for Africa (EUTF). Its contents are the sole responsibility of Altai Consulting and do not necessarily reflect the views of the European Union.

Cover photo: Altai Consulting, Adré, Chad, 2024

ALTAI CONSULTING

Altai Consulting provides research and monitoring & evaluation services to public institutions and international organisations in developing countries.

Our teams operate in more than 50 countries in Africa, the Middle East and Central Asia. Since its inception 20 years ago, Altai Consulting has developed a strong focus on migration, governance and sustainable development related research and programme evaluations.

Contact Details:

Philibert de Mercey (Project Director): pdemercey@altaiconsulting.com

Eric Davin (Altai Partner): edavin@altaiconsulting.com

www.altaiconsulting.com

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

This report was prepared by Eric Davin, Justine Rubira, Philibert de Mercey, Manuel Schädler, Manon Buttaro and Amir Hamdane.

We gratefully thank project staff from the implementing partners who took the time to sit with us and comply with our reporting requirements. We are indebted to:

- COGINTA, Enabel and Promediation in Burkina Faso;
- AFD in Chad;
- CIVIPOL in Côte d'Ivoire;
- ICMPD and UNCDF in Ghana;
- Enabel in Guinea;
- Expertise France, GIZ, IFAD and WFP in Mali;
- FILAPP in Mauritania;
- Enabel, Karkara and GIZ in Niger;
- AFD, CIVIPOL and Enabel, in Senegal;
- Enabel in The Gambia;
- ACH, Camões I.P, *Croix-rouge Burkinabè*, Danish Institute for Human Rights, *Expertise France, Investisseurs & Partenaires*, IRC, PMLAL, Save the Children and Terre des Hommes, at the regional level.

We would also like to thank the European Union (EU) Delegations to Burkina Faso, Chad, Côte d'Ivoire, Ghana, Guinea, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Senegal and The Gambia as well as the EUTF team in Brussels.

CONTENTS

CONTENTS	4
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY	5
1. INTRODUCTION.....	9
1.1. Background	9
1.2. The EUTF SLC window in 2024	9
2. METHODOLOGY	10
2.1. MLS methodology	10
2.2. Challenges and limitations in the S1 2024 Report	11
3. PORTFOLIO OVERVIEW	12
3.1. Budget and number of contracts by status.....	12
3.2. Budget distribution by country, implementing partner and Strategic Objective	15
4. SITUATION AND RESULTS OVERVIEW.....	17
4.1. The Sahel and Lake Chad region in S1 2024	17
4.2. The EUTF response – overview of results	18
5. ANALYSIS BY COUNTRY	41
5.1. Burkina Faso	41
5.2. Ghana	48
5.3. Mali	54
5.4. Niger	60
5.5. Senegal.....	67
CONCLUSIONS	71
6. INDEX	73
6.1. Tables	73
6.2. Figures	73


EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This is the 14th report prepared by the Monitoring and Learning System (MLS) for the Sahel and Lake Chad (SLC) window. It covers all outputs achieved through funding from the European Union Emergency Trust Fund for stability and addressing root causes of irregular migration and displaced people in Africa (EUTF for Africa or EUTF) in the SLC region, from the start of activities until 30 June 2024, with a specific focus on outputs generated in S1 2024.

This report includes outputs from programmes implemented in Benin, Burkina Faso, Cabo Verde, Cameroon, Chad, Côte d'Ivoire, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, The Gambia and Togo.¹

As of 30 June 2024, the EUTF for Africa had committed² EUR 5.0B (billion), including EUR 2.2B to 114 decisions in the SLC window. A total of 213 operational projects have been contracted in the SLC region, including 184 completed projects and 29 projects in implementation. 25 of the projects currently in implementation have data or other qualitative information to report and four are either too early in their implementation phase to be able to report outputs or their activities have not yet generated outputs that are relevant to the EUTF indicators. The current report includes data on 209 projects (equivalent in funding to EUR 2.09B), comprising 184 completed projects, as well as 25 projects in their implementation phase with data to report.

Figure 1: Contracted budget breakdown by country and Strategic Objective, June 2024³



Strategic Objective 1: Greater economic and employment opportunities

West Africa experienced positive economic trends in the first half of 2024, with GDP growth projected to rise from 3.6% in 2023 to 4.2% in 2024.⁴ Increased production of natural gas and crude oil in Senegal, recovering oil production and fiscal reforms in Nigeria, and exchange rate stability and fiscal consolidation in Ghana contributed to enhanced economic activities.⁵ However, high public debt levels in several countries (particularly in Ghana, Guinea-Bissau, Cameroon, Chad, and The Gambia) remained a significant concern.⁶ While inflation was expected to ease slightly in 2024 across the region (down to 20%)⁷, Nigeria experienced a rise in inflationary pressure, linked to significant depreciation of the national currency.⁸ Despite these improvements, significant risks remained, including energy and food price volatility stemming from the ongoing war in Ukraine, tensions in the Middle East⁹, unreliable

¹ Outputs in Benin, Cabo Verde, Guinea-Bissau and Togo are collected through regional programmes.

² This refers to funds allocated following decisions by the Operational Committees.

³ Share of budget for projects contracted and relevant to the MLS.

⁴ AfDB, 'African Economic Outlook 2024', 2024. Retrieved [here](#).

⁵ Ibid.

⁶ EBID, 'West African Development Outlook', June 2024. Retrieved [here](#).

⁷ Ibid

⁸ Reasons for the depreciation were the wide 2022 fiscal deficit, the introduction of new naira notes, foreign exchange controls, and a strengthened dollar. Ibid.

⁹ EBID, 'West African Development Outlook', June 2024. Retrieved [here](#).

domestic electricity production¹, and unfavourable weather conditions impacting agriculture.² A concerning long-term threat is the projected significant negative impact of climate change on West African GDPs and food security over the next two decades³, with substantial job losses⁴ and increased staple food prices anticipated.⁵

In S1 2024, nine programmes under SO1 were active, representing 21% of the budget allocated to this SO (Bab Al Amal⁶, *Diaspora Mali*⁷, GrEEen GH⁸, IPDEV2⁹, Make it in The Gambia¹⁰, ProEmploi¹¹, PromoPêche GIZ/ILO¹², PST-ML¹³, *Stabilisation Agadez*¹⁴). Five of the nine programmes came to an end during the semester and only four continued beyond June 2024. Results for SO1 indicators in the first half of 2024 were the lowest since the EUTF's launch. This was primarily due to the closure of numerous programmes, as the end of the EUTF implementation cycle approaches. Specifically, indicators 1.1 and 1.4 achieved only 1% of their overall EUTF results since 2018, while indicator 1.2 had an even lower contribution. Despite this overall decline in output, indicator 1.3 (people assisted with income-generating activities or IGAs) showed a rather high result, with 56,549 individuals supported, primarily through PDU PMM¹⁵ in Burkina Faso, PDU PROGRESS¹⁶ in Niger, and GrEEen UNCDF¹⁷ in Ghana for S1 2024.¹⁸ Most of the beneficiaries were women.

Strategic Objective 2: Strengthening the resilience of communities and in particular the most vulnerable, including refugees and other displaced people

The first half of 2024 witnessed a severe worsening of food security in West Africa and particularly in the Sahel, with a projected record of 52 million people facing acute food insecurity during the 2024 lean season (IPC Phase 3 or higher). Burkina Faso and Nigeria experienced unprecedented crises, reaching emergency level (IPC Phase 4).¹⁹ In the Sahel region, conflict, climate change, and economic instability converged to cause this crisis. Conflict disrupted agriculture and humanitarian aid distribution²⁰, while extreme weather severely impacted crop and livestock production. These factors led to soaring food prices, limiting access to staple foods, particularly for vulnerable households. The cost of maintaining a healthy diet increased dramatically, exacerbating the situation.²¹ Political instability and conflict further fuelled forced displacement, leading to exploitation and the

¹ Ibid.

² AGRA et al., 'Food Security Monitor: Edition 47', May 2024. Retrieved [here](#).

³ CGD, 'The Socioeconomic Impact of Climate Change in Developing Countries in the Next Decades', February 2024. Retrieved [here](#).

⁴ World Bank, 'Africa's Pulse', October 2024. Retrieved [here](#).

⁵ CGD, 'The Socioeconomic Impact of Climate Change in Developing Countries in the Next Decades', February 2024. Retrieved [here](#).

⁶ TD-03: *Projet de soutien à l'insertion socio-professionnelle des jeunes tchadiens en situation de vulnérabilité*.

⁷ ML-05: *Projet d'appui aux investissements de la diaspora malienne dans les régions d'origine*.

⁸ GH-02: Boosting green employment and enterprise opportunities in Ghana.

⁹ REG-11: *Soutenir les entrepreneurs et les petites PME en Afrique de l'Ouest*.

¹⁰ GM-03: Building a future - Make it in The Gambia.

¹¹ NE-13: *Promotion de l'emploi pour le renforcement de la résilience économique des communautés dans la région de Tillabéry*.

¹² MR-04: *Création d'emplois décents et consolidation de l'emploi existant pour les jeunes et potentiels migrants dans le secteur de la pêche artisanale*.

¹³ ML-14: *Programme de soutien à la transition en République du Mali*.

¹⁴ NE-12: *Stabilisation et renforcement socio-économique des populations affectées par la migration irrégulière dans les zones de transit au Niger*.

¹⁵ REG-18-10: *Améliorons nos vies ! Rétablir les espaces socio-économiques ruraux sécurisés et contrecarrer les menaces des changements environnementaux et des conflits socioculturels*.

¹⁶ REG-18-09: PROGRESS (*Programme de résilience et de cohésion sociale au Sahel*).

¹⁷ GH-02-02: Boosting green employment and enterprise opportunities in Ghana.

¹⁸ In addition, 67 people (0.1%) were reached by PROSTARAZ in Niger.

¹⁹ Cadre Harmonisé, 'Résultats de l'analyse de la situation actuelle et projetée de l'insécurité alimentaire aiguë', 16 March 2024. Retrieved [here](#).

²⁰ Cadre Harmonisé, 'Résultats de l'analyse de la situation actuelle et projetée de l'insécurité alimentaire aiguë', 16 March 2024. Retrieved [here](#).

²¹ FSIN, 'Regional report on food and nutrition security for West Africa and the Sahel', 11 June 2024. Retrieved [here](#).

disruption of essential services. Numerous school and health centres closures, particularly in Burkina Faso¹, threatened an entire generation's education and health.²

In S1 2024, four programmes under SO2 were active (*Etat Civil CI*³, *PROJES*⁴, *PDU*⁵ and *Résilience ASP*⁶), totalling 23% of the budget allocated to this SO. These programmes were particularly active in the Sahel countries and notably addressed WASH, nutrition and food security challenges. *PDU Eau Burkina Faso*⁷ facilitated the construction of 50 latrines (Indicator 2.1), benefitting 422 individuals from host communities and 578 IDPs (Indicator 2.2) in Burkina Faso. Three PDU projects (*PARIC*⁸, *PMM*, and *PROGRESS*) addressed malnutrition in the region. *PARIC* supported 2,613 individuals (Indicator 2.3), training women on Infant and Young Child Feeding (IYCF). *PMM* trained 3,314 pregnant and lactating women on IYCF techniques and screened 18,643 children for malnutrition in both Burkina Faso and Niger. *PROGRESS* provided training to 79,062 women in Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger on mid-upper arm circumference (MUAC) measurement, and trained 1,138 women on the baby WASH approach in Burkina Faso and Niger. Additionally, *PST-Resilience*⁹ distributed vouchers to prevent malnutrition in Mali, benefitting 21,140 people.

Strategic Objective 3: Improved migration management in countries of origin, transit, and destination

During the first half of 2024, displacement in the SLC region continued to increase, primarily driven by violence in Sahel countries and Nigeria. The five Sahel countries (Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania, and Niger) accounted for 49% of the region's refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs) – an estimated 4.9 million people – by June 2024, including a growing number of IDPs.¹⁰ The Sudanese crisis further fuelled displacement, including towards Chad.¹¹ Coastal countries also experienced an increase in refugees entering the countries from the Sahel states. Nigeria hosted the highest number of IDPs across the region (3,397,531), while also receiving mainly Cameroonians refugees.¹² Transit countries like Libya and Algeria continued deportations, often in inhumane conditions.^{13,14} Meanwhile, the Atlantic route to the Canary Islands remained the most important migration corridor for SLC nationals in S1 2024.¹⁵

By the first half of 2024, only three of the initial 12 programmes¹⁶ focusing on SO3 remained active (8% of the budget allocated to this SO): *ALTP Golfe de Guinée*¹⁷, *Migration SN*¹⁸, and *Border Security GH*.¹⁹ Only *ALTP Golfe de Guinée* reported results for SO3 indicators during this semester. While not focusing on SO3, three other programmes still contributed to SO3-related indicators (*Diaspora Mali*, *POC MR*²⁰ and *Stabilisation Agadez*). Results primarily focused on migration

¹ OCHA, 'Burkina Faso, Mali and Western Niger - Humanitarian Snapshot', 23 May 2024. Retrieved [here](#).

² NRC, 'West and Central Africa: Alarming rise in school closures', 9 September 2024. Retrieved [here](#).

³ CI-02: *Appui à la mise en œuvre de la stratégie nationale de l'état civil et de l'identification en Côte d'Ivoire*.

⁴ ML-10: *Programme Jeunesse et Stabilisation – régions du centre du Mali*.

⁵ REG-18: *Programme d'urgence pour la stabilisation des espaces frontaliers du G5 Sahel*.

⁶ NE-14: *Résilience agro-sylvo pastorale, Ouest Niger*.

⁷ REG-18-16: *Projet de renforcement de l'accès à l'eau potable et assainissement au profit des personnes déplacées internes (PDI) dans la région du Sahel*.

⁸ REG-18-11: *Appui à la résilience et à la réduction de la conflictualité dans les communautés de Mopti au Mali et de Soum au Burkina Faso*.

⁹ ML-14-12: *Résilience et développement durable sur la bande agropastorale au Mali*.

¹⁰ Compared numbers from: UNHCR, 'Monthly Statistics', December 2023 and June 2024. Retrieved [here](#) and [here](#).

¹¹ Compared numbers from: UNCHR, 'Chad – Situation map of forcibly displaced persons and stateless (June 2024)' and 'Monthly Statistics – June 2024'. Retrieved [here](#) and [here](#).

¹² UNCHR, 'Nigeria: Urban Refugees & Asylum-seekers Dashboard (As of 30 June 2024)', 16 July 2024. Retrieved [here](#).

¹³ The Jordan Times, 'Libya deports migrants back to Nigeria', 30 January 2024. Retrieved [here](#).

¹⁴ InfoMigrants, 'Libya repatriates 174 Nigerian migrants, plans more returns', 27 June 2024. Retrieved [here](#).

¹⁵ Figures extracted and compared from Frontex, 'Detections of illegal border-crossings', September 2024. Retrieved [here](#).

¹⁶ Programmes and projects of the EU-IOM Joint Initiative are summarised as one programme.

¹⁷ REG-12: *Appui à la Lutte contre la Traite des Personnes dans les pays du Golfe de Guinée*.

¹⁸ SN-06: *Renforcement de la gestion et de la gouvernance des migrations et le retour et la réintégration durable au Sénégal et accompagnement des investissements de la diaspora sénégalaise*.

¹⁹ GH-01: Strengthening border security in Ghana.

²⁰ MR-09: *Partenariat Opérationnel Conjoint pour la Mauritanie*.

management and protection trainings (indicator 3.7), with particular emphasis on migrant smuggling and the protection of victims of trafficking in persons through ALTP *Golfe de Guinée*. In Niger, *Stabilisation Agadez*, through PROSTARAZ¹, provided training and operational support (indicator 3.6) to the four communal migration observatories in Kantché, Zinder region, to strengthen capacity in protecting, assisting, and facilitating the voluntary return of migrants.

Strategic Objective 4: Improved governance, security and conflict prevention

The first half of 2024 witnessed significant instability and political tensions in West Africa, reflected by the withdrawal of Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger from the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). This followed diplomatic disputes stemming from the 2023 coup in Niger and subsequent ECOWAS sanctions², which led to the formation of the Alliance of Sahel States (*Alliance des États du Sahel*, AES).³ Meanwhile, the AES countries consolidated military rule⁴ and diversified international partnerships, particularly moving away from France and the EU and towards Russia⁵, while experiencing a surge in violent incidents.⁶ Heightened violence in Nigeria resulted in the highest number of conflict-related fatalities in West Africa in over two decades.⁷ Finally, presidential elections in the region brought renewal in Senegal⁸, continuity in Mauritania⁹, and consolidation of authoritarian rule in Chad.¹⁰

During S1 2024, 11 programmes accounting for 21% of the SO4 budget remained active, focusing on strengthening governance and the rule of law, including three which came to an end during the semester (*Etat Civil GN*¹¹, *PAGS II*¹², *PEV*¹³). Nine EUTF-funded projects reported results for SO4 indicators in the first half of 2024. They supported the renovation of 19 governance infrastructures (12% of the total since the EUTF's launch), improving access to basic civil documents in Senegal and Guinea, and developing military justice infrastructure in Burkina Faso (indicator 4.1). Moreover, a total of 1,025 individuals received governance-related training, primarily focusing on the judiciary and security forces. This included training for 1,025 prosecutors, judges, and security personnel in Burkina Faso and Ghana (indicator 4.2).

¹ NE-12-02: *Projet de stabilisation et du renforcement socio-économique dans les régions d'Agadez et de Zinder*.

² ICG, 'What Turmoil in ECOWAS Means for Nigeria and Regional Stability', 29 March 2024. Retrieved [here](#).

³ IDOS, 'Aktuelle Entwicklungen der regionalen Integration in Westafrika – Herausforderungen für die künftige Gestaltung der Außen- und Entwicklungspolitik', January 2024. Retrieved [here](#).

⁴ UNSC, 'Activities of the United Nations Office for West Africa and the Sahel: Report of the Secretary-General', 1 July 2024. Retrieved [here](#).

⁵ Ibid

⁶ ACLED, 'ACLED – Explorer', consulted in December 2024. Retrieved [here](#).

⁷ ACLED, 'ACLED – Explorer', consulted in December 2024. Retrieved [here](#).

⁸ Ehing, C., 'A glimmer of hope for West Africa?', 2 April 2024. Retrieved [here](#).

⁹ Al Jazeera, 'Mauritania re-elects President Ghazouani for a second term', 1 July 2024. Retrieved [here](#).

¹⁰ ACLED, 'Between violence, geopolitical competition, and the quest for social justice: Chad's road to elections', 30 April 2024. Retrieved [here](#). USIP, 'At the Sahel's Center, Tensions Rises Over Chad's Disputed Election', 15 May 2024. Retrieved [here](#).

¹¹ GN-05: *Projet pilote d'amélioration des performances de l'état civil guinéen par le recours à la digitalisation*.

¹² REG-20: *Programme d'Appui au G5 pour la Sécurité au Sahel Phase II*.

¹³ BF-08: *Rebâtir une cohésion sociale au Nord du Burkina à travers un meilleur suivi de la radicalisation, la promotion du dialogue et la valorisation de l'économie pastoraliste*.

1. INTRODUCTION

1.1. BACKGROUND

The European Union Emergency Trust Fund for stability and addressing the root causes of irregular migration and displaced people in Africa (EUTF for Africa or EUTF) was launched in November 2015. It is composed of three geographical windows: North Africa (NoA), Horn of Africa (HoA), and Sahel and Lake Chad (SLC), which includes 12 main countries: Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Chad, Côte d'Ivoire, Ghana, Guinea, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, and The Gambia. Neighbouring countries are also eligible for regional programmes. This report includes outputs from programmes implemented in 16 countries: the 12 mentioned above, as well as Benin, Cabo Verde, Guinea-Bissau, and Togo.¹

This is the 14th report prepared by the Monitoring and Learning System (MLS) for the EUTF SLC window, covering all outputs achieved with EUTF funding in the SLC region, from the start of activities through the end of June 2024, with a specific focus on outputs generated in the first semester of 2024. Previous reports can be found [here](#).

1.2. THE EUTF SLC WINDOW IN 2024

As of June 2024, the EUTF had committed (i.e. allocated funds following decisions by the EUTF Operational Committees) EUR 5.0B (billion euros). The SLC window is the first in size in terms of funding, with EUR 2.2B committed across 114 decisions.² There are 213 operational contracts of interest to the MLS.³ Of these, 184 projects worth EUR 1.88B are completed and 29 projects worth EUR 235.0M (million euros) are being implemented. Of the 29 projects currently being implemented, 25 have data to report.⁴ This report presents data from 209 projects, including 184 completed projects, covering a total contracted amount of EUR 2.09B. As such, it does not cover any new project compared to the 2023 annual MLS report.

Funding and implementation continue to follow the EUTF's four strategic objectives⁵ (SOs) and the strategic priorities set by the EUTF Strategic Board and ratified in September 2019 – i) returns and reintegration; ii) refugee management; iii) completing progress on the securitisation of documents and civil registry; iv) anti-trafficking measures; v) essential stabilisation efforts; and vi) migration dialogue.

¹ Outputs in Benin, Cabo Verde, Guinea-Bissau and Togo are collected through regional programmes and are presented in section 4.2 of this report, which provides an overview of the results.

² EUTF website. Retrieved [here](#).

³ Projects are considered operational when they deliver outputs to beneficiaries. Administrative projects and non-operational projects (e.g. projects contracted under the Research and Evidence Facility and the Technical and Cooperation Facility, feasibility studies, audits, etc.) are not included in the analysis.

⁴ Four projects were either too early in their implementation phase to be able to report outputs at the time of writing, or their activities had not yet generated outputs relevant to the EUTF indicators.

⁵ The four strategic objectives (SO) of the EUTF are: SO1 'Greater economic and employment opportunities'; SO2 'Strengthening resilience of communities and in particular the most vulnerable including refugees and other displaced people'; SO3 'Improved migration management in countries of origin, transit and destination'; and SO4 'Improved governance and conflict prevention and reduction of forced displacement and irregular migration'.

2. METHODOLOGY

2.1. MLS METHODOLOGY

2.1.1. OUTPUT MONITORING

The MLS team works with each implementing partner (IP) to develop a reporting system that allows the MLS to collect the most detailed and granular level of data common to all IPs. To that end, the MLS has developed a reporting template that it uses with most IPs, although the reporting template is tailored to each project through a drafting and feedback process with respective IPs. Given the complexity and diversity of the EUTF portfolio, and the fact that IPs and monitoring and evaluation (M&E) systems have different resources, limitations and capacities, the MLS strives to offer as much flexibility as possible with regard to the quantity, disaggregation and format of data collected from IPs.

The MLS then aggregates the collected data using a standardised methodology (and later disaggregates it again during reporting). This approach allows the MLS to help IPs map their own activities and outputs against the list of EUTF common output indicators and to have access to a finer level of disaggregation (e.g. by gender, beneficiary type, location, etc.). It also gives the MLS significant flexibility in changing the way data is analysed or presented as needed.

Based on the information received, the MLS team completes output indicator mappings for each project, collects the relevant data from each IP, checks the data for quality, and enters it into the MLS database for aggregation and for further quality checking and analysis.

During the S1 2020 reporting period, the EUTF revised its common output indicators and their respective methodologies. The resulting revisions have been formalised through a set of methodological notes, provided in the annexes to the S1 2020 report. For more information about this process, please see the S1 2020 report.

2.1.2. OUTCOME ANALYSIS

In addition to output monitoring, the EUTF MLS started to include project- and programme-level outcome analyses in S2 2020 in the form of focus boxes for certain completed projects. As explained in previous reports, as well as in this [MLS methodological note](#), aggregating outcome data for the EUTF portfolio is not possible in the way that it is for output data, as there are no common or standardised EUTF outcome indicators. This means that no methodologically harmonised outcome data has been collected by EUTF projects, without which comprehensive and meaningful outcome analysis is impossible. Therefore, it was agreed that the MLS would not undertake a comprehensive quantitative aggregation of outcome indicators across projects.

However, as part of the broader efforts of the MLS to assess potential large-scale changes resulting from the EUTF in its areas of implementation, in March 2022, the team conducted a review of all outcome indicators reported on by projects completed prior to July 2021¹, to assess whether partial aggregation could be feasible in some cases and if limited conclusions could be drawn about the potential outcomes of the EUTF portfolio beyond specific projects and programmes.

A total of 56 projects that ended before S2 2021 in the SLC window were assessed as part of this exercise.² Of these 56, 35 projects had shared a final evaluation report with the MLS team. The remaining 21 projects: were not relevant to a final evaluation; were pending a final evaluation as they

¹ This deadline was selected for projects in this study, in order to be in line with EUTF directives, which requires that final reports be submitted no later than six months after the end of the project. It should be noted, however, that the lack of a final report after this deadline may be due to a number of factors, including the possibility that reports were not made available to the MLS team.

² See footnote 1.

had recently ended; were part of an ongoing programme; or did not make the documents available to the MLS team. Collectively, these projects reported on 514 outcome and impact indicators, of which 370 were categorised by the MLS as 'true' outcome indicators.¹ Among those, 313 indicators were assessed by the team as SMART². Combining results in initial SLC and HoA analysis, 33 common outcome indicator categories were identified. 20 of these were relevant to outcomes mapped under SLC projects.

However, while categories allow indicators to be grouped in batches of similar expected outcomes, the way indicators are measured or defined often prevents aggregation. Even in cases where outcome indicators are exactly equivalent, aggregated values cannot be weighted or calculated without knowing the relevant population or sample size. Furthermore, limitations in the quality and availability of project indicator descriptions and data negatively affect their aggregation potential. In many cases, indicators measured at baseline were not measured again at endline (or vice versa), or the endline evaluation collected data for a similar but incomparable indicator to the one used at baseline.

As such, it is only possible to aggregate a limited number of indicators across EUTF projects and, even in these cases, methodological limitations and caveats must be considered. These aggregable indicators were then analysed in the SO sections of the 2021 annual report, and these analyses will be continually revised in future annual reports (as a significant majority of additional completed projects are required before the aggregated data can be sufficiently updated).

2.2. CHALLENGES AND LIMITATIONS IN THE S1 2024 REPORT

During implementation of the methodological changes, some projects were unable to provide the additional disaggregation requested. In these cases, data was included under the 'unspecified' category in the MLS analyses. Others lacked data for the newly created indicators. Significant cases of this include:

- Due to the methodological changes to the common output indicators performed in S1 2020, not all previously gathered GIZ data could be transferred to the changed system. Therefore, the GIZ data included in this report is not complete and numbers may differ from earlier reports.³
- For completed projects where IPs could no longer be contacted, the MLS team has applied only those methodological changes that were feasible without consultation, taking project documents (e.g. final evaluations) as reference.

Data for S1 2024 was received from all projects for which it was expected, except for PDU P-CSEPA (REG-18-05) which did not send data this semester.

Finally, it is important to note that, as projects are closing, they compile their total outputs and often conduct a complete revision of their data. They sometimes request the MLS to correct past data over the lifetime of the project. The full list of corrections impacting data reported in past MLS reports is provided in Annex 6. This semester, corrections were introduced by *Diaspora Mali FIDA*⁴, PEV Accra⁵, PDU ACOR⁶, PDU PMM⁷ and PST-Resilience.

¹ 'True' refers here to an outcome indicator representing a short-term or medium-term effect of an activity's output and not the direct product resulting from the development intervention, as per the OECD 'Glossary of Key Terms in Evaluation and Results Based Management'. Retrieved [here](#).

² Specific, Measurable, Attainable, Relevant, and Time-bound.

³ However, historical data for all projects was retroactively adapted to the methodological changes whenever possible. Therefore, data provided within the same report is comparable, even across reporting periods.

⁴ ML-05-02: *Investissement de la diaspora dans l'entrepreneuriat durable des jeunes ruraux au Mali*.

⁵ BF-08-11: *Construire de nouvelles coopérations entre pasteurs nomades et transhumants et les Etats de l'Initiative d'Accra*.

⁶ REG-18-06: *Alliance pour la cohésion sociale et la résilience au Mali et en Mauritanie – lot 1 Fuseau ouest et zones limitrophes (ACOR)*.


⁷ REG-18-10: *Améliorons nos vies ! Rétablir les espaces socio-économiques ruraux sécurisés et contrecarrer les menaces des changements environnementaux et des conflits socioculturels*.

3. PORTFOLIO OVERVIEW

3.1. BUDGET AND NUMBER OF CONTRACTS BY STATUS

As of 30 June 2024, the EUTF for Africa had committed¹ EUR 5.0B, including EUR 2.2B to 114 decisions in the SLC window. A total of 213 operational projects have been contracted in the SLC region, including 184 completed projects and 29 projects in implementation. Of the projects currently being implemented, 25 had data or other qualitative information to report. The remaining four projects were either too early in their implementation to be able to report outputs or their activities had not yet generated outputs relevant to the EUTF indicators. The current report includes data on 209 projects (equivalent in funding to EUR 2.09B), comprising 184 completed projects, as well as 25 projects in their implementation phase with data to report.

Figure 2: Projects and budget covered by the S1 2024 MLS report, June 2024




Since the publication of the previous report, no new project has been added to the MLS database or to this report.

The graph below represents the evolution in the number of EUTF contracted operational projects as well as the number of projects included in the MLS reports, together with the corresponding funding amounts.


¹ This refers to funds allocated following decisions by the Operational Committees.

Figure 3: Evolution of projects and budgets covered by the MLS in SLC, June 2024



The graph below shows the 213 contracted operational projects by budget, lifespan, and status of implementation. The graph uses abbreviated programme names for clarity. Budgets refer solely to the EUTF contribution. The length of the bars represents the lifespan of the project, and the height/width represents the EUTF budget per project. The colour of the bars indicates the status of the project, as shown in the key. Dates of completion are considered as of June 2024.


Figure 4: EUTF SLC contracted projects by budget and implementation status, June 2024



3.2. BUDGET DISTRIBUTION BY COUNTRY, IMPLEMENTING PARTNER AND STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE

As of June 2024, regional projects collectively represented the largest amount of contracted EUTF funding: a total of EUR 667.3M (or 31% of the total) was contracted to 55 projects at the regional level. At the country level, Niger, Mali, and Burkina Faso had the largest portfolios, with respective budgets of EUR 290.6M (14%), EUR 285.3M (13%), and EUR 190.1M (9%).

Figure 5: Budget distribution by country and implementing partner, June 2024¹



The EUTF SLC budget for operational contracted projects remains largely managed by Member State agencies (EUR 885.6M, or 42% of the budget), as well as United Nations (UN) agencies, funds, and programmes (EUR 509.0M, or 24%). Projects managed by non-governmental organisations (NGOs) represent 19% (or EUR 392.9M) of the total budget. The governments of recipient countries directly receive 11% (or EUR 237.7M) of the budget, mostly in the form of budget support actions, followed by international organisations and the private sector, with 3% (EUR 69.2M) and 1% (EUR 24.3M) of the budget, respectively.²

With regard to the strategic objectives (SOs), security and governance activities (SO4) receive the largest share of the budget at 32% (EUR 667.9M). SO4 is the main priority in Burkina Faso (69% of the budget), Nigeria (56%), Niger (42%), Mali (41%) and Mauritania (41%). Regional projects receive the

¹ The map shows the distribution of the combined SLC budget (€2.1B) for the 213 operational projects, per country.

² For many contracts, parts of the budgets are subcontracted by IPs (including Member State agencies and United Nations agencies, funds and programmes) at least in part to NGOs and CSOs.


largest amount of funding for SO4 (EUR 134.4M), followed by Burkina Faso (EUR 131.9M), Niger (EUR 120.7M) and Mali (EUR 117.4M).

Resilience building (SO2) represents 25% of the EUTF funds in the SLC window (EUR 536.8M) and is particularly significant in Chad (74% of national budget) and Cameroon (49%) as well as among regional projects (32%), which represent EUR 215.1M, followed by Mali (EUR 90M), Chad (EUR 82.5M), and Nigeria (EUR 39.0M).

Economic and employment opportunities (SO1) are supported by 23% (or EUR 492.9M) of the EUTF SLC budget. These types of activities are particularly important in West African coastal countries, such as The Gambia (90% of the total funds allocated to this country), Côte d'Ivoire (83%), Guinea (82%), Ghana (80%) and Senegal (55%). In absolute numbers, the countries with the largest amount of funding dedicated to SO1 are Senegal with EUR 90.3M and Niger with EUR 87.0M.

Finally, migration management (SO3) represents another 20% (EUR 421.1M) of total EUTF funding in SLC. SO3 is funded primarily through regional programmes, which represent EUR 277.3M. National country programmes dedicated to SO3 are prevalent in Niger (EUR 53.9M) and Senegal (EUR 28.4M).

Figure 6: Contracted budget breakdown by strategic objective, June 2024¹



¹ Share of budget for projects contracted and relevant to the MLS.

4. SITUATION AND RESULTS OVERVIEW

4.1. THE SAHEL AND LAKE CHAD REGION IN S1 2024

In the first half of 2024, conflict in West Africa intensified further, particularly in the central Sahel and Nigeria. Violence-inflicted fatalities in S1 2024 across West Africa reached the highest level in the past 20 years¹, up by 16% compared to the previous semester. Most fatalities were recorded in Nigeria (5,285) and Burkina Faso (4,590), increasing by 27% and 25%, respectively.² Jihadist aggressions were among the main sources of conflict, although violence was also exercised by security actors, civil defence forces,³ and organised criminal groups.⁴ Spillover of conflict from the central Sahel into coastal states continued to pose serious security threats in the northern regions of these countries.

Enhanced conflict was a key driver of forced displacement, affecting 10.1 million people across the 12 EUTF SLC countries⁵, 193,093 more than at the end of 2023. Most forcibly displaced people in S1 2024 were in Nigeria (35%) and Burkina Faso (21%). Moreover, the conflict in Sudan drove more people into Chad, which was hosting 1.3 million refugees as of June 2024, up by 145,468 since January 2024. Compared to these regional displacements, movements of West Africans towards Europe remained relatively small: In S1 2024, 17,053 SLC nationals were detected on the Atlantic Route travelling to the Canary Islands. Another 6,347 travelled on the Central Mediterranean Route towards Europe.⁶ This represents an 83% decrease for the Central Mediterranean Route and a 39% decrease for the Atlantic Route, compared to S2 2023, although detections were still higher than in S2 2022 and previous semesters.

While economic imbalances began to ease in S1 2024, inflation and currency depreciation still affected a large share of West African populations, primarily the most vulnerable. Gross domestic product (GDP) growth across the region was expected to increase from 3.6% in 2023 to 4.2% in 2024⁷ and inflation was expected to slightly ease in 2024 before substantially decreasing in 2025.⁸ Nevertheless, many West African households continued to suffer from reduced purchasing power as a result of inflation and local currency depreciation. In Nigeria, the most populous country in West Africa with 224 million people, the share of people living in extreme poverty was expected to increase from 41.4% in 2023 to 47.2% in 2024.⁹ Furthermore, debt distress continued to narrow budgetary leeway to respond to situations of crises, including acute food distress.

From March to May 2024, 38 million people across West Africa faced acute food insecurity, a number that was expected to rise to 52 million during the 2024 lean season.¹⁰ This would be 7 million more people than during the 2023 lean period when 45 million people faced acute food insecurity (IPC Phase or higher).¹¹ From January to May 2024, most food insecure people in West Africa lived in Nigeria (25 million), while Chad recorded the sharpest increase in food insecurity during this period, compared to the same timeframe in 2023. In addition to extreme weather events and economic shocks,

¹ ACLED, 'ACLED – Explorer', consulted in December 2024. Retrieved [here](#). Countries included are Benin, Burkina Faso, Cabo Verde, Cameroon, Chad, Côte d'Ivoire, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, The Gambia, and Togo.

² ACLED, 'ACLED – Explorer', consulted in December 2024. Retrieved [here](#).

³ CGRA, 'Situation sécuritaire – Burkina Faso', 17 September 2024. Retrieved [here](#).

⁴ ACLED & GI-TOC, 'Non-state armed groups and illicit economies in West Africa: Armed bandits in Nigeria', July 2024. Retrieved [here](#).

⁵ Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Chad, Côte d'Ivoire, Ghana, Guinea, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal and The Gambia. The figures include refugees, asylum seekers and IDPs.

⁶ Figures extracted and compared from Frontex, 'Detections of illegal border-crossings', September 2024. Retrieved [here](#).

⁷ AfDB, 'African Economic Outlook 2024', 2024. Retrieved [here](#).

⁸ EBJD, 'West African Development Outlook', June 2024. Retrieved [here](#).

⁹ World Bank, 'Nigeria Macro Poverty Outlook', October 2024. Retrieved [here](#).

¹⁰ Cadre Harmonisé, 'Résultats de l'analyse de la situation actuelle et projetée de l'insécurité alimentaire aigüe', 16 March 2024. Retrieved [here](#).

¹¹ Cadre Harmonisé, 'Résultats de l'analyse de l'insécurité alimentaire et nutritionnelle aigue courante en mars-mai 2023 et projetée en juin-août 2023', March 2023. Retrieved [here](#).

the influx of Sudanese refugees put additional pressure on local food stocks and livelihoods, particularly in the east of the country.¹

Finally, the political divide in West Africa deepened further, as Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger announced their withdrawal from the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) in January 2024. Their announcement followed military coups in the three countries, the formation of the Alliance of Sahel States (*Alliance des États du Sahel*, AES), and escalating diplomatic disputes in the aftermath of the coup in Niger in July 2023.² In S1 2024, Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger further strengthened ties with Russia while pursuing the rupture with Western countries. For example, Niger announced the termination of its military agreements with the United States, after French troops had withdrawn from the country.³ Meanwhile, the leaders in Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger consolidated their military rule, not least through national dialogues in Burkina Faso and Mali, which recommended extensions of the transition periods until 2029 and 2027, respectively.

4.2. THE EUTF RESPONSE – OVERVIEW OF RESULTS

This section offers an analysis of the results of the EUTF's response to date against its four strategic objectives: economy and employment; resilience (food security and access to basic services); migration management; and governance and conflict prevention.


¹ FSIN, 'Regional report on food and nutrition security for West Africa and the Sahel', 11 June 2024. Retrieved [here](#).

² IDOS, 'Aktuelle Entwicklungen der regionalen Integration in Westafrika – Herausforderungen für die künftige Gestaltung der Außen- und Entwicklungspolitik', January 2024. Retrieved [here](#).

³ UNSC, 'Activities of the United Nations Office for West Africa and the Sahel: Report of the Secretary-General', 1 July 2024. Retrieved [here](#).

4.2.1. OVERVIEW OF EUTF COMMON OUTPUT INDICATORS

Figure 7: Main achievements of EUTF-funded programmes in June 2024



The table below shows the aggregated values reported by SLC projects for the 38 EUTF common output indicators as of 30 June 2024.


Table 1: EUTF common output indicators for all SLC projects, June 2024¹

EUTF Indicator	2016-2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023	S1 2024	Total	Evolution
1.1 Number of direct jobs created or supported	17,333	24,311	30,917	31,189	33,976	20,926	1,110	159,761	
1.2 Number of MSMEs created or supported	4,234	4,555	10,652	15,953	13,668	4,028	22	53,112	
1.3 Number of people assisted to develop income-generating activities	74,906	96,819	77,451	123,943	232,221	170,057	56,549	831,945	
1.4 Number of people benefiting from professional training (TVET) ...	32,254	44,718	31,062	61,718	52,593	15,439	2,686	240,470	
1.5 Number of industrial parks and/or business infrastructure constructed...	18	326	169	144	70	11	28	766	
2.1 Number of local development plans directly supported	70	122	57	61	130	30	0	470	
2.1 bis Number of social infrastructure built or rehabilitated	1,573	3,443	2,421	3,259	979	744	142	12,561	
2.2 Number of basic social services delivered	403,805	459,923	127,115	49,791	374,841	20,871	13,706	1,450,062	
2.3 Number of people receiving nutrition assistance	580,237	737,215	341,586	218,742	443,193	360,180	125,910	2,787,063	
2.4 Number of people receiving food security-related assistance	522,319	698,582	801,273	561,208	502,031	370,655	136,313	3,592,382	
2.5 Number of institutions that adopt local disaster risk reduction strategies	182	218	17	45	15	6	2	485	
2.6 Hectares of agricultural and pastoral ecosystems where sustainable...	11,413	93,450	21,461	33,434	54,399	28,394	188	242,739	
2.7 Number of people reached by sensitisation campaigns on resilience...	666,654	1,337,305	34,126,065	9,823,573	16,391,681	945,059	145,176	63,435,514	
2.8 Number of staff from local authorities and basic service providers trained...	15,129	33,331	52,437	34,128	9,761	14,040	4,659	163,486	
2.9 Number of people having access to improved basic services	2,423,091	1,340,869	735,825	1,055,852	887,837	825,402	357,844	7,636,720	
3.1 Number of projects and initiatives supported by diaspora members	19	36	36	127	152	11	2	383	
3.2 Number of migrants in transit, refugees/asylum seekers and IDPs protected...	61,089	12,320	18,100	64,235	55,909	4,885	0	216,538	
3.3 Number of potential migrants, reached by information campaigns on migration	443,515	1,022,823	1,253,904	1,808,879	13,893,695	3,009,789	450	21,433,066	
3.4 Number of voluntary returns supported	29,194	19,165	16,231	8,012	193	420	0	73,215	
3.5 Number of returning migrants benefitting from post-arrival assistance	47,775	22,572	10,625	11,415	11	0	0	92,398	
3.5 bis Number of returning migrants benefitting from reintegration assistance	17,971	18,099	31,008	22,224	2,770	796	4	92,872	
3.6 Number of institutions strengthened on migration management	64	328	80	50	4	20	4	550	
3.7 Number of individuals trained on migration management	729	1,615	3,655	8,214	4,662	1,690	387	20,953	
3.8 Number of people of concern benefitting from evacuation and resettlement...	2,915	1,395	583	465	18	0	0	5,376	
3.10 Number of people benefitting from legal migration and mobility programmes	11	326	305	210	31	0	0	883	
3.11 Number of awareness-raising events on migration	10,340	4,122	1,816	655	487	348	2	17,770	
4.1 Number of infrastructures supported to strengthen governance	22	22	23	49	13	6	19	154	
4.1 bis Number of equipment provided to strengthen governance	2,315	1,313	7,099	34,193	19,033	11,436	798	76,187	
4.2 Number of staff trained on governance, conflict prevention and human rights	13,686	10,696	10,717	22,290	22,064	21,528	1,370	102,351	
4.3 Number of people participating in conflict prevention...	544,936	432,030	2,649,590	472,090	865,943	1,619,040	561,874	7,145,505	
4.6 Number of strategies, laws, policies and plans developed...	133	728	377	871	712	144	42	3,007	
5.1 Number of multi-stakeholder groups and learning mechanisms formed...	213	760	921	1,079	859	1,120	98	5,050	
5.2 Number of planning, monitoring and/or learning tools set up...	188	311	2,374	2,144	2,496	172	3	7,688	
5.3 Number of field studies, surveys and other research conducted	158	201	150	572	599	299	26	2,005	
5.4 Number of regional cooperation initiatives created, launched or supported	47	44	19	36	17	18	12	193	
6.1 Number of pandemic-related supplies provided	0	0	11,465,917	2,147,301	6,844	0	0	13,620,062	
6.2 Number of people directly benefitting from COVID-19 activities	0	0	745,288	1,120,130	3,554,229	1,506,130	0	6,925,777	
6.3 Number of entities benefitting from COVID-19 activities	0	0	1,234	1,130	195	23	0	2,583	

¹ Trendlines represent quarterly non-cumulated outputs across time.

4.2.2. GREATER ECONOMIC AND EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITIES

Figure 8: Strategic Objective 1 dashboard, SLC, June 2024¹



In the first half of 2024, macroeconomic policies to fight inflation, improve the fiscal balance, and promote growth delivered initial results in West Africa. GDP growth across the region was

¹ Budget figures are related to projects that are contracted, relevant to the MLS, and providing data.

expected to increase from 3.6% in 2023 to 4.2% in 2024.¹ Increased production of natural gas and crude oil in Senegal, recovering oil production and fiscal reforms in Nigeria, and exchange rate stability and fiscal consolidation in Ghana contributed to enhancing economic activity.² Although high levels of public debt continued to adversely impact the economy, fiscal reforms succeeded in stabilising the fiscal deficit across West Africa at 4.5% of GDP, a figure projected to decline to 3.9% in 2025.³ Notably, Benin, Côte d'Ivoire and Senegal resumed issuing sovereign bonds in early 2024.⁴ Nonetheless, Ghana remained in debt distress and Cameroon, Chad, The Gambia, and Guinea-Bissau were assessed to be at high risk of debt distress.⁵ Inflation in West Africa was expected to slightly ease in 2024 (20.0%, down from 20.6% in 2023), before substantially decreasing in 2025 (16.4%).⁶ Against this general trend, inflation was on the rise in Nigeria, West Africa's largest economy, which represents more than half of ECOWAS' GDP. An important driver of inflation in Nigeria was the depreciation of the naira, which lost 68.4% of its value between March 2023 and March 2024.⁷ In addition to reinforcing inflation, the depreciation also contributed to increased hard currency-denominated debt burdens. However, the introduction of a unified, market-driven exchange rate in mid-2023 was expected to slow the depreciation and mitigate the related economic risks.⁸

Despite these initial signs of an economic recovery in West Africa, energy and food price volatility remained a substantial risk. Notably, inflationary pressures dissipated on the back of lower energy prices, which had increased previously as a result of the war in Ukraine⁹ However, external price shocks related to international conflict could resurge considering the continuing war in Ukraine and the exacerbating tensions in the Middle East. Indeed, global crude oil prices increased in the first half of 2024.¹⁰ Moreover, unreliable domestic electricity production in the region also faced a risk of price volatility. In the first half of 2024, Ghana, Guinea, Mali, Niger, Nigeria and Togo experienced incessant power outages, often linked to insufficient electricity supply from Nigeria. Responding to low production, Nigeria's electricity regulator imposed a six-month cap on electricity exports to Benin, Niger and Togo, a measure that was expected to exacerbate existing power supply shortages in these countries.¹¹ Moreover, agricultural output and food prices remained highly dependent on favourable weather conditions, a stable macroeconomic environment, and the absence of conflict.¹² In the first half of 2024, cereal prices exceeded their five-year average in West Africa because of below-average supply, low replenishment of stocks, insecurity, and trade restrictions.¹³

In the future, the adverse impacts of climate change on agricultural production and food prices are expected to become increasingly apparent. According to the Centre for Global Development (CGD), which conducted a meta-study on the socio-economic impact of climate change on developing countries, of all regions in Africa, West Africa will suffer from the largest climate change-inflicted loss of GDP over the next two decades.¹⁴ The study found that the effects of climate change – more frequent and intense floods and droughts, loss of farmland value and reduced productivity – will impact agricultural production, leading to diminished growth. Taking into consideration a global temperature increase of 1.5°C, moreover, the International Labour Organisation (ILO) estimated that, by 2030, West Africa would lose 4.8% of working hours, the equivalent of 9 million full-time jobs.¹⁵ The CGD's meta-

¹ AfDB, 'African Economic Outlook 2024', 2024. Retrieved [here](#).

² Ibid.

³ EBID, 'West African Development Outlook', June 2024. Retrieved [here](#).

⁴ World Bank, 'Africa's Pulse', October 2024. Retrieved [here](#).

⁵ World Bank, 'Debt Sustainability Analysis (DSA)', consulted in April 2023. Retrieved [here](#).

⁶ EBID, 'West African Development Outlook', June 2024. Retrieved [here](#).

⁷ Reasons for the depreciation were the wide 2022 fiscal deficit, the introduction of new naira notes, foreign exchange controls, and a strengthened dollar. Ibid.

⁸ World Bank, 'Nigeria Macro Poverty Outlook', October 2024. Retrieved [here](#).

⁹ EBID, 'West African Development Outlook', June 2024. Retrieved [here](#).

¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹ Ibid.

¹² AGRA et al., 'Food Security Monitor: Edition 47', May 2024. Retrieved [here](#).

¹³ FEWS NET, 'Global Price Watch June 2024 Prices', 31 July 2024. Retrieved [here](#).

¹⁴ CGD, 'The Socioeconomic Impact of Climate Change in Developing Countries in the Next Decades', February 2024. Retrieved [here](#).

¹⁵ World Bank, 'Africa's Pulse', October 2024. Retrieved [here](#).

study also estimated that staple food prices would increase substantially. For example, the price of maize was projected to increase by 87–106% between 2010 and 2050, and the price of rice was projected to increase by 31–78%.¹ Other adverse effects of climate change on economic development concern the availability of water resources, health, and energy security. Overall, it was estimated that climate change would cause a 4–11% decline in GDP in Africa and that poverty would be 20–30% higher in Africa in a climate change scenario compared with a no-climate-change scenario.²

The EUTF has contracted EUR 492.9M (23% of the total EUTF SLC budget) to enhance economic and employment opportunities (SO1) in the region. The EUTF primarily targets inclusive job creation focusing on the most vulnerable, both through the job market and through the provision of support for income-generating activities (IGAs). In addition, it aims to strengthen micro-, small-, and medium-sized enterprises (MSMEs) through improved governance, access to funding, and enterprise development, as well as by building, renovating, and expanding business infrastructure. Finally, its programmes support professional training (technical and vocational education and training [TVET]) and skills development.

In S1 2024, nine programmes under SO1 were active, representing 21% of the budget allocated to this SO (Bab Al Amal, *Diaspora Mali*, GrEEn GH, IPDEV2, Make it in The Gambia, ProEmploi, Promopeche GIZ/ILO, PST-ML, *Stabilisation Agadez*). Five of the nine programmes came to an end during the semester and only four continued beyond June 2024 (Bab Al Amal, GrEEn GH, IPDEV2, PST-ML). The four ongoing programmes comprised five projects focusing on SO1. These five ongoing projects were being implemented in Chad (Bab Al Amal), Ghana (GrEEn UNCDF), and Mali (PROJES II³ and PST-Resilience), as well as at the regional level (IPDEV2). In the first half of 2024, the five projects reported results in Benin, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Chad, Côte d'Ivoire, Ghana, Guinea, Mali, Niger, Senegal and Togo.

Diminishing SO1 results despite substantial IGA support


In S1 2024, the number of jobs created (indicator 1.1), the number of MSMEs supported (indicator 1.2), and the number of people benefitting from TVET and skills development (indicator 1.4) were the lowest since the launch of the MLS, as numerous projects are closing. For the three indicators, the S1 2024 results represented 1% (indicator 1.1 and 1.4) or less (indicator 1.2) of the global results registered for that indicator since 2018. Of the programmes focusing on SO1, three were concluded in 2021, five in 2022, and eight in 2023. In S1 2024, four additional programmes were closed (*Diaspora Mali*, Make it in The Gambia, Promopêche GIZ/ILO and *Stabilisation Agadez*), and the remaining four programmes were expected to close at the end of 2024. Meanwhile, no new programme has started since January 2021. Accordingly, a decreasing number of programmes (both focusing on SO1 and other SOs) have yielded results under EUTF indicators 1.1 to 1.4 since 2022: from 31 in S1 2022 and S2 2022 to 21 in S1 2023 and only 7 and 8 in S2 2023 and S1 2024, respectively.

¹ CGD, 'The Socioeconomic Impact of Climate Change in Developing Countries in the Next Decades', February 2024. Retrieved [here](#).

² Ibid.

³ ML-14-14: *Programme Jeunesse et Stabilisation II*.

Figure 9: Output evolution EUTF indicator 1.1, SLC, June 2024



In S1 2024, EUTF-funded projects assisted 56,549 people to develop IGAs, bringing the total to 831,945 (indicator 1.3). Although lower than the average half-year result for this indicator, the S1 2024 results still represented the fifth largest output since 2019. Of those assisted with IGAs, 71% were reached by PDU PMM in Burkina Faso, 18% by PDU PROGRESS in Niger, and the rest by GrEEen UNCDF in Ghana.¹ The majority (61%) of beneficiaries were women, mainly because PDU PMM reached 73% women and 27% men. PDU PMM supported IGAs by providing access to financial services and relevant infrastructure and tools, such as machines for vegetable production or mills for agricultural by-products to produce nutritious animal feed. Beneficiaries of PDU PROGRESS received training and kits to develop IGAs in the areas of transport and retail, and GrEEen UNCDF facilitated financial education and supported access to financial services. While PDU PROGRESS was closed in S1 2024, PDU PMM and GrEEen UNCDF were expected to close in S2 2024.


IPDEV2, PROSTARAZ and Bab Al Amal were the only projects engaging in TVET and skills development in 2024, together reaching 2,686 people (indicator 1.4). This is the lowest value since 2018 and represents only 1.1% of the overall EUTF results for this indicator. IPDEV2, a regional project aimed to support entrepreneurs and small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) through local investment funds, accounted for 78% of people benefitting from TVET and skills development in S1 2024. The remaining 22% were attributable to PROSTARAZ in Niger (12%) and Bab Al Amal in Chad (10%). IPDEV2 strengthened the entrepreneurship ecosystem in its target countries by providing training to the staff of entrepreneurship support structures (e.g. business incubators). Further, the project trained entrepreneurs to effectively raise funds for their businesses. PROSTARAZ, which supported communities in Agadez and Zinder to develop economic alternatives to migration-related activities, provided technical training to 217 women and 112 men in agriculture, commerce and other sectors. The trainings benefitted both host communities (70%) and returning migrants (30%). Finally, Bab Al Amal supported comprehensive TVET for 266 people in Chad in S1 2024. In contrast to IPDEV2

¹ In addition, 67 people (0.1%) were reached by PROSTARAZ in Niger.

and PROSTARAZ, Bab Al Amal worked with nationally accredited training institutes and the training lasted longer than one year. While PROSTARAZ closed its activities in the first half of 2024, IPDEV2 and Bab Al Amal were scheduled to close in the second half of 2024.


4.2.3. STRENGTHENING THE RESILIENCE OF COMMUNITIES

Figure 10: Strategic Objective 2 dashboard, SLC, June 2024



In the first half of 2024, food security became increasingly precarious in West Africa and the Sahel. The *Cadre Harmonisé* projected a record 52 million people to face acute food insecurity across the region during the 2024 lean season (IPC Phase 3 or higher)¹, surpassing the previous year's peak of 44.8 million.² Burkina Faso and Nigeria experienced an unprecedented crisis, with over 423,000 people in Burkina Faso and 1 million people in Nigeria at an extreme emergency level (IPC Phase 4). In Mali, 2,575 individuals faced famine (IPC Phase 5) in the Ménaka region. The food insecurity stemmed from a convergence of conflict, climate change, and economic instability. Conflict and insecurity, particularly in the Lake Chad Basin in northwest and north-central Nigeria and the Liptako-Gourma region of the central Sahel, severely disrupted agriculture, pastoralism, market access and the distribution of humanitarian aid.³ Extreme weather – erratic rains and droughts – significantly impacted crops and livestock in Chad, Niger, and Nigeria. Consequently, cereal production declined slightly in 2023-2024 compared to the previous year. These circumstances raised food prices significantly, limiting access to staple foods for the most vulnerable households, while the cost of maintaining a healthy diet surged to up to six times that of a basic energy-based diet, intensifying the difficulties associated with accessing nutritious food.⁴

Figure 11: Number of people at stages 3 to 5 of IPC, June 2024



Political instability and armed conflict in West and Central Africa drove the number of forcibly displaced people up to 10.1 million in S1 2024 across the 12 EUTF SLC countries.⁵ Displacement exposed people to kidnapping, extortion, looting, and both physical and sexual violence, making migration routes and pastoralist corridors extremely dangerous. Women and children faced heightened vulnerability to exploitation, abuse and trafficking. Inadequate shelter, water and sanitation worsened already dire conditions. Persistent insecurity prevented returns, causing repeated internal displacement and eroding resilience. Competition for resources also intensified between host communities and

¹ Cadre Harmonisé, 'Résultats de l'analyse de la situation actuelle et projetée de l'insécurité alimentaire aiguë', 16 March 2024. Retrieved [here](#).

² Cadre Harmonisé, 'Résultats de l'analyse de l'insécurité alimentaire et nutritionnelle aiguë', 20 March 2023. Retrieved [here](#).

³ Cadre Harmonisé, 'Résultats de l'analyse de la situation actuelle et projetée de l'insécurité alimentaire aiguë', 16 March 2024. Retrieved [here](#).

⁴ FSIN, 'Regional report on food and nutrition security for West Africa and the Sahel', 11 June 2024. Retrieved [here](#).

⁵ Compared numbers from: UNHCR, 'Monthly Statistics', December 2023 and June 2024. Retrieved [here](#) and [here](#).

displaced populations.¹ The central Sahel displacement crisis spilled over into northern Benin, Côte d'Ivoire, Ghana and Togo, overwhelming basic services. Schools and health facilities closed or operated at minimal capacity, while the region also grappled with public health emergencies and climate-related disasters like floods.²

By May 2024, armed violence in the Sahel had led to over 8,216 school closures, most of them in Burkina Faso (5,319 closures).³ Although the number of closures in Burkina Faso decreased slightly since December 2023 (8,397)⁴, it remained substantial. The Norwegian Refugee Council warned that an entire generation could suffer from a lack of education, resulting in severe long-term socio-economic consequences. Girls face heightened risks of forced marriage and exploitation when removed from protective environments and their systems of support and supervision are disrupted.⁵ The security crisis also severely impacted health care. At least 478 health centres were closed across the Sahel's most affected regions⁶, a slight increase over the past six months (471 as of December 2023).⁷ In Burkina Faso alone, 347 health centres were closed. In addition, many rural health centres were non-functional or operating at minimal capacity. Massive displacement further strained health-care resources in areas where they remained accessible.⁸

The EUTF has contracted EUR 536,8M (25% of EUTF total funding) to 26 programmes aiming to support resilience in the region. In S1 2024, four programmes were active (*Etat Civil CI*, PROJES, PDU and *Résilience ASP*), totalling 23% of the budget allocated to this strategic objective. PROJES closed its activities in May 2024, while the three others will continue until the end of 2024.

Improving Sanitation in Burkina Faso

Burkina Faso grapples with important WASH (Water, Sanitation, and Hygiene) deficiencies. As of 2022 only 21% of the rural population and 40.8% of urban residents possessed basic sanitation amenities.⁹ Poor access to WASH leads to rampant open defecation, especially in rural zones, and poses significant public health hazards. Burkina Faso pledged to eradicate open defecation by 2030. Despite this ambition, a notable increase in the proportion of the population without access to sanitation utilities was observed between 2017 and 2021, rising from 53% to 64%. The International Water and Sanitation Centre (IRC), a think tank that promotes long-term solutions to the global crisis in water, sanitation and hygiene services, deemed that at the current pace of improvement, the country would not meet its goal by 2030.¹⁰ Sanitation challenges are exacerbated by the security crisis and the resulting mass displacement. According to a survey conducted by Impact Initiative among internally displaced persons (IDPs), a quarter (23%) of displaced households were not utilising improved latrines. Amidst these challenges, humanitarian aid remains insufficient: the same survey found that only 13% of households reported having received WASH assistance.¹¹

PDU Eau Burkina Faso, implemented by the Burkinabe Red Cross, aimed to address these challenges by enhancing WASH conditions for IDPs and host communities. The project planned to construct 701 improved latrines over its four-year implementation period from December 2020 to December 2024. As of June 2024, 424 were built (indicator 2.1 bis). The project experienced a delay due to the volatile security situation and the increase in prices of materials for latrine construction. It is therefore not guaranteed that it will reach its objective. However, this semester, the project managed to construct 50 latrines (indicator 2.1 bis), improving sanitation for 422 community members and 578 IDPs

¹ UNHCR, 'UNHCR urges global response to neglected humanitarian crisis in the Sahel', 7 June 2024. Retrieved [here](#).

² UNHCR, 'Response in coastal countries linked to central Sahel crisis spillover', 7 August 2024. Retrieved [here](#).

³ OCHA, 'Burkina Faso, Mali and Western Niger – Humanitarian Snapshot', 23 May 2024. Retrieved [here](#).

⁴ OCHA, 'Burkina Faso, Mali and Western Niger – Humanitarian Snapshot', 18 December 2023. Retrieved [here](#).

⁵ NRC, 'West and Central Africa: Alarming rise in school closures', 9 September 2024. Retrieved [here](#).

⁶ OCHA, 'Burkina Faso, Mali and Western Niger – Humanitarian Snapshot', 23 May 2024. Retrieved [here](#).

⁷ OCHA, 'Burkina Faso, Mali and Western Niger – Humanitarian Snapshot', 18 December 2023. Retrieved [here](#).

⁸ OCHA, 'Burkina Faso, Mali and Western Niger – Humanitarian Snapshot', 23 May 2024. Retrieved [here](#).

⁹ Sanitation and Water for All, 'Burkina Faso Prioritizes Sanitation and Climate Resiliency Under SWA's Mutual Accountability Mechanism', 17 November 2022. Retrieved [here](#).

¹⁰ IRC, 'Strategic plan 2021-2025 – Burkina Faso', 6 November 2023. Retrieved [here](#).

¹¹ Impact Initiatives, 'Public health emergency in Burkina Faso', 22 May 2024. Retrieved [here](#).

(indicator 2.2). This was achieved through subsidies covering the full cost of family sanitation systems for vulnerable households, coupled with the contribution of volunteers—mostly from those same households—trained in constructing various latrine types. Beneficiary households were selected based on the Rapid Response Mechanism, a humanitarian intervention model designed to enable swift and effective responses to emergencies, particularly in conflict-affected settings. In this case it efficiently identified and prioritised households in need during emergencies, enabling quick assessments, data-driven decision-making, flexibility to adapt to evolving circumstances, and monitoring for effective assistance delivery.

Sahel malnutrition crisis and intervention efforts

Widespread chronic malnutrition poses a significant challenge in the Sahel region. Across the six West African countries of this region,¹ 2.8 million cases of global acute malnutrition (GAM) were reported in the first semester of 2024, including 640,000 cases of severe acute malnutrition (SAM). Recent data revealed high levels of stunted children under five years of age and some regions in Mali and Burkina Faso even exceeded SAM according to the *Cadre Harmonisé* emergency thresholds (>15%). Over 39% of GAM cases and 44% of SAM cases in the Sahel urgently require food and nutritional support.² Malnutrition significantly impacts children, hindering their growth, health, and longer-term prospects. It stunts physical development, compromises immunity, and impairs cognitive abilities, leading to learning difficulties and reduced educational attainment. The economic consequences are substantial, perpetuating a cycle of poverty as malnourished individuals often experience lower adult incomes, affecting both their own lives and those of future generations.³

Three projects of the PDU programme addressed malnutrition in the Sahel in S1 2024: PARIC; PMM; and PROGRESS. PARIC trained women on Infant and Young Child Feeding (IYCF) and implemented a family-based approach to screen for SAM. It also facilitated referrals to health centres providing support to 2,613 individuals in Mali and Burkina Faso (indicator 2.3). In Burkina Faso, the PMM project trained 3,314 pregnant and lactating women on IYCF techniques. PMM also screened 18,631 children under five years of age (9,888 girls and 8,743 boys) for malnutrition in Niger. PROGRESS trained women in the mid-upper arm circumference (MUAC)⁴ measurement – an innovative and user-friendly tool that allows mothers to easily and quickly detect malnutrition from home, without the need for health-care providers, reaching 79,062 women across Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger. It also implemented a baby WASH approach that combines WASH and nutrition interventions, benefitting 1,138 women in Burkina Faso and Niger. In addition to the PDU programme, PST-Resilience directly strengthened nutritional resilience through voucher transfers in Mali, benefitting 21,140 people. Beneficiaries were enrolled on a digital platform, receiving unique identification cards encoding voucher amounts. Local merchants, trained by the project in voucher use, redeemed these cards.

¹ Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania, Niger and Senegal.


² FSNWG, 'Alerte Urgente sur l'Afrique de l'Ouest et du Centre', 2 mai 2024. Retrieved [here](#).

³ UNICEF, 'Consequences of Chronic Malnutrition', 6 November 2020. Retrieved [here](#).

⁴ The MUAC measurement method is a tool used to assess nutritional status and detect malnutrition. It involves measuring the circumference of the upper arm at the midpoint between the shoulder and elbow using a graduated band.

4.2.4. IMPROVED MIGRATION MANAGEMENT

Figure 12: Strategic Objective 3 dashboard, SLC, June 2024¹



In the first half of 2024, displacement in the SLC region remained high, mostly driven by violence in the Sahel and in Nigeria. Together, the five countries in the Sahel (Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania, Niger) accounted for 49% of refugees and IDPs in the region. Recent political developments and ongoing insecurity in these countries continued to drive displacement. As of June 2024, these countries hosted an estimated 4.9 million displaced people – 296,951 more than six months before – including 3 million IDPs. The crisis in Sudan pushed more refugees into Chad, which hosted 1,251,319 refugees at the end of June 2024, including 145,468 new arrivals since January.¹ Of the refugees in Chad, 86% were Sudanese fleeing violence in their home country.² Between December 2023 and June 2024, Niger also experienced a significant increase in refugee arrivals, with an additional 105,750 people seeking refuge in the country.³ Among the refugees, the largest groups are from Nigeria (58%), Mali (30%), Burkina Faso (9%), and Chad (2%).⁴ The number of Malian refugees nearly doubled over the semester, rising from 67,761 to 124,420. Additionally, 36,190 Nigerians, 7,431 Chadians, and 5,493 Burkinabe sought asylum in Niger during the same period.⁵ As regional displacement rose, movements toward coastal countries also increased, with Benin, Côte d'Ivoire, Ghana and Togo hosting 147,461 refugees, an increase of 31,134 compared to the end of 2023. Nigeria continued to host the highest number of IDPs in the region, with 3.4 million persons of concern as of June 2024.⁶

Following the abrogation of the law criminalising assistance to illegal migration in the Agadez region by the Nigerien junta in November 2023, there has been an increase in movements within and from Niger. Between December 2023 and June 2024, the country experienced a rise in internal displacement, with an additional 72,153 IDPs reported, bringing the total number of IDPs in Niger to 407,430.⁷ At the same time, the number of registered individuals leaving Niger increased from 79,291 in November 2023 to 134,202 in May 2024.⁸ This can be explained by the general increase in migration flows between Niger and Libya⁹ following the abrogation of the law criminalising assistance to illegal migration in the Agadez region. A DTM¹⁰ survey in Libya between January and May 2024 confirmed the continued importance of Niger as a transit country towards Libya: nearly half the migrants surveyed (46%) in Libya reported having travelled through (or coming from) Niger, particularly migrants from Burkina Faso, Ghana, Niger and Nigeria.¹¹

Transit countries, such as Libya and Algeria, continued to deport sub-Saharan migrants back to neighbouring countries or their home countries. According to NGO observers, Algeria continued to expel migrants from its territory, leaving them stranded in the desert zone at the Nigerien border. Between January and May 2024, an estimated 14,328 people were returned from Algeria to the Niger-Algeria border, about 15 kilometres from the Nigerien village of Assamaka.¹² These expulsions reportedly occur in 'violent and inhuman conditions' and have led to the deaths of several migrants.¹³ Moreover, between January and June, Libyan authorities carried out a series of deportations, sending hundreds of Nigerian migrants back to their home country.^{14,15}

¹ Budget figures are related to projects which are contracted and relevant to the MLS.

² Compared numbers from: UNHCR, 'Monthly Statistics', December 2023 and June 2024. Retrieved [here](#) and [here](#).

³ Compared numbers from: UNHCR, 'Chad – Situation map of forcibly displaced persons and stateless (June 2024)' and 'Monthly Statistics – June 2024'. Retrieved [here](#) and [here](#).

⁴ Compared numbers from: UNHCR, 'Monthly Statistics', December 2023 and June 2024. Retrieved [here](#) and [here](#).

⁵ Compared numbers from: UNHCR, 'Monthly Statistics' and 'Niger – Map Population of Concern', June 2024. Retrieved [here](#) and [here](#).

⁶ Compared numbers from: UNHCR, 'Niger - Map Population of Concern', December 2023 and June 2024. Retrieved [here](#) and [here](#).

⁷ Compared numbers from: UNHCR, 'Monthly Statistics', December 2023 and June 2024. Retrieved [here](#) and [here](#).

⁸ Ibid.

⁹ Compared numbers from: IOM, 'Niger – Rapport sur le suivi des flux de populations', November 2023 and May 2024. Retrieved [here](#) and [here](#).

¹⁰ IOM, 'Nigerien migrants in Libya', June 2024. Retrieved [here](#).

¹¹ Displacement Tracking Matrix.

¹² IOM, 'Libya – Migrant Report 52 (March - May 2024)', 31 May 2024. Retrieved [here](#).

¹³ Alame Phone Sahara, 'Mai 2024 : 8 personnes migrantes décédées à Assamaka à la frontière nigéro-algérienne', 10 May 2024. Retrieved [here](#).


¹⁴ Ibid.

¹⁵ The Jordan Times, 'Libya deports migrants back to Nigeria', 30 January 2024. Retrieved [here](#).

¹⁶ InfoMigrants, 'Libya repatriates 174 Nigerian migrants, plans more returns', 27 June 2024. Retrieved [here](#).

The Atlantic Route to the Canary Islands remained the busiest route for nationals of SLC countries. After reaching a record level in the second half of 2023 with 32,513 migrants arriving in the Canary Islands, including 28,089 nationals from the SLC region, the route has remained a key migration corridor.¹ Between January and June 2024, 72% of the 23,499 nationals of SLC countries detected on migration routes to Europe took the Atlantic route to the Canary Islands. SLC nationals accounted for 88% of the 19,261 detections on this route during the period.² In this context, the EU concluded a migration partnership with Mauritania, a key departure and transit point for migrants travelling to the Canary Islands. The agreement foresees the allocation of EUR 210 million to Mauritania to support border management, socio-economic opportunities for young people, legal migration pathways, migrant protection, and the fight against irregular migration and migrant smuggling.³ At the same time, Senegalese authorities led a series of sea interceptions off the coast of the capital, Dakar, and Saint-Louis (near the border with Mauritania). In May, the national Navy intercepted four boats transporting more than 550 people.⁴

Figure 13: Number of IDPs and refugees, and main migration flows, June 2024⁵



The EUTF has contracted EUR 421.1M (20% of EUTF total funding) to 12 programmes aiming to implement migration management-related activities in the SLC region. Since each programme can encompass several projects, a total of 30 projects were implemented. Two-thirds of the funding (66%) were allocated to seven regional programmes.

¹ Figures extracted and compared from Frontex, 'Detections of illegal border-crossings', September 2024. Retrieved [here](#).

² Ibid.

³ European Commission, 'The European Commission launches new migration partnership with Mauritania', 7 March 2024. Retrieved [here](#).

⁴ VOA, 'Plus de 500 migrants interceptés par la Marine sénégalaise depuis début mai', 16 May 2024. Retrieved [here](#).

⁵ The borders depicted in this map do not represent political opinions.

In S1 2024, only three of the 30 projects remained active. The regional project, ALTP *Golfe de Guinée*, ended by the end of the semester, while the two national projects, Diaspora Senegal¹ and Border Security GH in Ghana, were set to conclude by the end of the year.

Given the limited number of SO3 projects still active this semester and their limited outputs, this SO section will not display output-based stories, as provided in the other SO sections.

Remaining results in S1 2024

Of the three SO3 projects remaining active in S1 2024, only ALTP *Golfe de Guinée* achieved results related to migration management. Diaspora Senegal and Border Security GH reported results under other SOs. In addition, three national projects under other SOs delivered results aligned with SO3 indicators: *Diaspora Mali FIDA*²; PROSTARAZ (both SO1); and POC MR (SO4).

Active projects and results achieved	Results
Diaspora Mali FIDA	
3.1 Number of projects and initiatives supported by diaspora members	2
3.7 Number of individuals trained on migration management and protection	14
POC MR	
3.7 Number of individuals trained on migration management and protection	13
PROSTARAZ	
3.6 Number of institutions and non-state actors strengthened through capacity building or operational support on protection and migration management	4
3.7 Number of individuals trained on migration management and protection	109
ALTP Golfe de Guinée	
3.3 Number of (potential) migrants reached by information campaigns on migration	450
3.5 bis Number of returning migrants benefitting from reintegration assistance	4
3.7 Number of individuals trained on migration management and protection	251
3.11 Number of awareness raising events on migration	2

Results primarily focused on migration management and protection trainings (indicator 3.7), with particular emphasis on migrant smuggling and the protection of victims of trafficking in persons through ALTP *Golfe de Guinée*. PROSTARAZ in Niger also provided training to staff members, along with operational support (indicator 3.6), to the four communal migration observatories in Kantché, Zinder region, to strengthen capacity in protecting, assisting, and facilitating the voluntary return of migrants.

Retrospective analysis on voluntary returns and post-arrival / reintegration assistance over the EUTF's period

Between 2018 and 2021, the EU-IOM Joint Initiative (JI) made significant efforts to facilitate returns and reintegration. In four years, the project supported 54,337 voluntary returns, representing 74% of the total returns funded by the EUTF (indicator 3.4). During the same period, the EU-IOM Joint Initiative provided post-arrival assistance to 66,151 people (indicator 3.5), and reintegration assistance to 47,956 individuals (indicator 3.5 bis). For these indicators, EU-IOM JI efforts represented respectively 72% and 52% of the total outputs achieved. Most returns were organised from Niger (85%) – a major migration crossroad for migrants expelled from North Africa – while 61% of post-arrival and reintegration assistances were concentrated in Guinea, Mali and Nigeria. Between 2018 and 2021, Guinean and Malian were among the most represented SLC nationalities detected at the European borders, accounting for respectively 25% and 21% of total entries.³

Other projects supported returns and reintegration in the early years of the EUTF's implementation. The Refugees' Resilience programme⁴, through its national components, supported

¹ SN-06-02: *Programme d'Appui aux Initiatives de Solidarité pour le Développement (PAISD) Phase III.*

² ML-05-02: *Investissement de la diaspora dans l'entrepreneuriat durable des jeunes ruraux au Mali.*

³ Figures extracted and compared from Frontex, 'Detections of illegal border-crossings', September 2024. Retrieved [here](#).

⁴ REG-06: *Renforcement de la résilience et de la capacité d'autonomisation des réfugiés, des rapatriés et des personnes déplacées internes liés au conflit du Nord Mali.*

6,527 returns to Burkina Faso, 5,243 to Niger and 2,743 to Mauritania, as well as post-arrival assistance for 4,480 people in Mali. Regarding reintegration assistance, significant results were achieved by *Gouvernance des migrations*¹ in Senegal, benefitting 16,200 people. DIZA Sud² provided similar assistance to 6,075 individuals in Chad.

Altogether, activities implemented between 2018 and 2021 bring the total number of voluntary returns supported to 72,602 (99% of the total returns supported over the EUTF's period), and the total number of post-arrival and reintegration assistance provided to respectively 92,387 and 89,302 (96% and almost 100% of all results achieved over the EUTF's period).


From 2022, results decreased sharply. PROSTARAZ organised 613 voluntary returns between 2022 and 2023, while DIZA Sud and ALTP Golfe de Guinée continued to provide reintegration assistance respectively to 613 people in Chad and 1,609 people across Côte d'Ivoire, Ghana, Guinea, Nigeria and Togo over the same period.

¹ SN-06-03: *Renforcement de la gouvernance inclusive de la migration au Sénégal en vue d'améliorer la synergie Migration et Développement.*

² TD-07-02: *Programme de développement inclusif dans les zones d'accueil Sud.*

4.2.5. IMPROVING GOVERNANCE AND CONFLICT PREVENTION

Figure 14: Strategic Objective 4 dashboard, SLC, June 2024¹



On 28 January 2024, Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger announced their withdrawal from the ECOWAS, with important consequences for the region. Tensions between ECOWAS and the military transition governments of the three countries sparked after the coup d'état in Niger in 2023,

¹ Budget figures are related to projects that are contracted, relevant to the MLS, and providing data.

when the former imposed severe sanctions and discussed a military intervention to re-establish constitutional order.¹ At the same time, Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger formed the AES, whose charter included an assistance clause in case of an attack on the sovereignty or territorial integrity of one of its members (Art. 6).² In response to the announced withdrawal, ECOWAS lifted virtually all sanctions and called for dialogue in order to avert a definitive exit by the stipulated one-year formal notification period.³ However, the AES countries declared their exit to be irreversible.⁴ The consequences of Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger leaving ECOWAS were assessed to be manifold. Economically, the end of the free movement of people and goods between AES and ECOWAS countries would significantly impair trade between landlocked AES countries and their neighbours.⁵ Politically, the withdrawal could weaken ECOWAS and favour persisting undemocratic governance in AES and other West African states, notably Guinea. Finally, the split made transnational security cooperation more difficult, particularly against the background of the spillover of conflict from the central Sahel into coastal countries, most notably Benin and Togo.⁶ Even regardless of the withdrawal, relations between ECOWAS and AES members were in crisis: between Benin and Niger (border closure⁷); Burkina Faso and Côte d'Ivoire (mutual accusations of conspiracy⁸); and Mali and Mauritania (incursions of Malian security forces into Mauritania in the context of counter-terrorism operations⁹).

Meanwhile, the three AES countries continued to consolidate military rule and diversify international partnerships amidst ongoing armed conflict. Fatalities resulting from violent incidents in Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger increased from 6,955 in the second half of 2023 to 7,624 in the first half of 2024. Most fatalities were registered in Burkina Faso (4,590), followed by Mali (2,142) and Niger (892).¹⁰ In January 2024, Bamako announced the immediate termination of the Agreement on Peace and Reconciliation (Algiers Accord), which had been concluded in 2015 between the Government of Mali and the Coordination of Azawad Movements (CMA), an umbrella organisation of different armed separatist groups.¹¹ The nullification of the agreement followed enhanced collaboration of Malian security forces with Wagner troops, including their joint seizure in November 2023 of the long-standing CMA stronghold Kidal, from where the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) had previously withdrawn its troops.¹² Similarly, Burkina Faso and Niger strengthened ties with Russia, while also striving for stronger cooperation with Turkey and Iran. Further, following the withdrawal of French troops from Niger, the country announced the termination of its military agreements with the United States.¹³ Domestically, all three countries continued to consolidate military rule. In Burkina Faso and Mali, national dialogues recommended an extension of the transition period to 2029 and 2027, respectively. In April, Niger dissolved municipal, regional and city councils and Mali suspended activities of political parties. Authorities in Guinea, where elections had been planned for 2024, also announced that the transition would continue until at least 2025.¹⁴

¹ ICG, 'What Turmoil in ECOWAS Means for Nigeria and Regional Stability', 29 March 2024. Retrieved [here](#).

² IDOS, 'Aktuelle Entwicklungen der regionalen Integration in Westafrika – Herausforderungen für die künftige Gestaltung der Außen- und Entwicklungspolitik', January 2024. Retrieved [here](#).

³ UNSC, 'Activities of the United Nations Office for West Africa and the Sahel: Report of the Secretary-General', 1 July 2024. Retrieved [here](#).

⁴ ICG, 'What Turmoil in ECOWAS Means for Nigeria and Regional Stability', 29 March 2024. Retrieved [here](#).

⁵ IDOS, 'Aktuelle Entwicklungen der regionalen Integration in Westafrika – Herausforderungen für die künftige Gestaltung der Außen- und Entwicklungspolitik', January 2024. Retrieved [here](#).

⁶ ICG, 'What Turmoil in ECOWAS Means for Nigeria and Regional Stability', 29 March 2024. Retrieved [here](#).

⁷ Ibid.

⁸ Le Monde, 'Entre la Côte d'Ivoire et le Burkina Faso, des accusations permanentes de complot', 27 September 2024. Retrieved [here](#).

⁹ UNSC, 'Activities of the United Nations Office for West Africa and the Sahel: Report of the Secretary-General', 1 July 2024. Retrieved [here](#).

¹⁰ ACLED, 'ACLED – Explorer', consulted in December 2024. Retrieved [here](#).

¹¹ ECFR, 'Mapping Armed Groups in Mali and the Sahel'. Retrieved [here](#).

¹² BBC, 'Mali army seizes key rebel northern stronghold Kidal', 14 November 2023. Retrieved [here](#).

¹³ UNSC, 'Activities of the United Nations Office for West Africa and the Sahel: Report of the Secretary-General', 1 July 2024. Retrieved [here](#).

¹⁴ Ibid.

In Nigeria, conflict also intensified, contributing to the highest number of violence-inflicted fatalities per semester in West Africa in over 20 years.¹ ACLED data across the region indicates that fatalities resulting from violent events amounted to 14,680 in the first half of 2024, 16% more than in the second half of 2023 and 13% more than in the first half of 2023. Most fatalities in S1 2024 were registered in Nigeria (5,285), up by 27% compared to S2 2023 and by 17% compared to S1 2023. Within Nigeria, fatalities in Borno State in S1 2024 still accounted for the highest share by state, albeit decreasing by 20%, compared to the previous semester. In contrast, violence-inflicted fatalities substantially increased in the states of Katsina (+326%), Zamfara (+115%), and Kaduna (+48%) to 870, 879 and 448, respectively, all in Nigeria's northwest.² The numbers underline the increased security risks posed by armed bandits in these areas. These bandits are rural-based criminal armed groups who engage in cattle rustling, kidnapping for ransom, armed robbery, and extortion of farming and mining communities.³ In recent years, they have consolidated their influence in many areas of Kaduna and Zamfara. Most recently, they are believed to have been behind the escalation of mass abductions in Nigeria's northwest. On 7 March 2024, gunmen kidnapped 287 pupils at a school in Kaduna State, followed by two more mass kidnappings on 9 March (15 children abducted) and 12 March (61 people abducted).⁴ An ACLED report associated the upsurge in mass kidnappings with the strategic use of Ramadan to pressure the government into paying ransom, the desire to gain bargaining leverage for the release of detained members of armed bandit groups, and the killing of an armed bandit leader in February 2024.⁵

Presidential elections in S1 2024 brought renewal in Senegal, continuity in Mauritania, and consolidation of authoritarian rule in Chad. In Senegal, former president Macky Sall's decision in February 2024 to postpone elections until December 2024 has been described as an attempted institutional coup d'état in a country with long democratic traditions.⁶ However, the Senegalese Constitutional Council, accompanied by nationwide protests, annulled the decision and cleared the path for elections to be held in March. Although opposition leader Ousmane Sonko had been declared ineligible beforehand, his close ally Bassirou Diomaye Faye was able to run for the PASTEF⁷ party. Just released from prison, Faye secured a first-round victory with 54% of the votes during peaceful elections.⁸ In Mauritania, president Ghazouani won the June 2024 elections with 56% of the vote, securing a second term.⁹ In S1 2024, Ghazouani was also elected as the new Chairperson of the African Union (AU) for 2024.¹⁰ In Chad, presidential elections in May ended the three-year transition period following the killing of former president Idriss Déby in 2021. Idriss Déby's son, Mahamat Déby, won the contested elections, which were preceded by increasing pressure on opposition parties.¹¹ Most importantly, one of Déby's leading political opponents, Yaya Dillo, was killed in February by members of the security forces in his party's headquarter in N'Djamena.¹² While Chad continued to host French and American military bases, Déby also aimed to diversify external relations, seeking the support of the Gulf States, China, Turkey and Russia.¹³

¹ ACLED, 'ACLED – Explorer', consulted in December 2024. Retrieved [here](#). Countries included are Benin, Burkina Faso, Cabo Verde, Cameroon, Chad, Côte d'Ivoire, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, The Gambia, and Togo.

² ACLED, 'ACLED – Explorer', consulted in December 2024. Retrieved [here](#).

³ ACLED & GI-TOC, 'Non-state armed groups and illicit economies in West Africa: Armed bandits in Nigeria', July 2024. Retrieved [here](#).

⁴ ACLED, 'What does the recent escalation of mass abductions in Nigeria tell us?', 15 March 2024. Retrieved [here](#).

⁵ Ibid.

⁶ IDOS, 'Die Republik Senegal am politischen Wendepunkt – zum Amtsantritt von Staatspräsident Faye', October 2024. Retrieved [here](#).

⁷ *Patriotes africains du Sénégal pour le travail, l'éthique et la fraternité*.

⁸ Ehing, C., 'A glimmer of hope for West Africa?', 2 April 2024. Retrieved [here](#).

⁹ Al Jazeera, 'Mauritania re-elects President Ghazouani for a second term', 1 July 2024. Retrieved [here](#).

¹⁰ AU, 'AU Chairperson'. Retrieved [here](#).

¹¹ ACLED, 'Between violence, geopolitical competition, and the quest for social justice: Chad's road to elections', 30 April 2024. Retrieved [here](#). USIP, 'At the Sahel's Center, Tensions Rises Over Chad's Disputed Election', 15 May 2024. Retrieved [here](#).

¹² HRW, 'Chad: Political Transition Ends with Déby's Election', 13 May 2024. Retrieved [here](#).

¹³ The Conversation, 'Chad's Mahamat Deby doubles down on authoritarian rule in wake of election victory', 3 June 2024. Retrieved [here](#).

The EUTF has contracted EUR 667.9M (32% of the EUTF SLC budget) to improve governance, security and conflict prevention in the SLC region. These funds were disbursed across 34 programmes implemented in eight countries and at the regional level. The largest share of funds was contracted at the regional level (20%) and in the countries most affected by the ongoing security crises, namely Burkina Faso (20%), Niger (18%), Mali (18%), and Nigeria (11%).

During S1 2024, 11 programmes accounting for 21% of the SO4 budget remained active, focusing on strengthening governance and the rule of law, including three which came to an end during the semester (*Etat Civil* GN, PAGES II, PEV). At the end of the semester, eight programmes focusing on SO4 were still active, while 26 had been completed. The eight programmes comprised 13 projects, representing 17% of the budget allocated to SO4. They were implemented in Burkina Faso (AJUMJUP¹, PARJI²), Mali (PARSEC EF³), Mauritania (POC MR), Niger (RDPPDH⁴, *Retournés Diffa*⁵, *Stabilisation* ESO Niger⁶), Senegal (Nekkal Civipol 27, Nekkal Enabel⁸) and at the regional level (G5 Security FSI⁹, G5 Law Compliance¹⁰, GESTDOC¹¹, WAPIS Chad¹²). 11 of the 13 ongoing projects were expected to end in the second half of 2024 and only two were expected to continue into 2025 (Nekkal Enabel, PARSEC EF).

Among all active EUTF projects in S1 2024, only nine reported MLS results for SO4-focused indicators during this semester. Relevant results (indicators 4.1, 4.1 bis, 4.2, 4.3, 4.6) were achieved in Burkina Faso (AJUMJUP, PARJI, PDU PMM, PDU PROGRESS), Cabo Verde (GESTDOC), Côte d'Ivoire (*Etat Civil* CI), Ghana (Border Security GH), Guinea (*Etat Civil* GN), Guinea-Bissau (GESTDOC), Mali (PDU PROGRESS), Niger (PDU PMM, PDU PROGRESS) and Senegal (Nekkal Enabel).

Strengthening access to basic rights and the rule of law

In S1 2024, three EUTF projects strengthened 19 governance infrastructures, representing 12% of all governance infrastructures supported since the EUTF's launch (indicator 4.1). The three projects contributing to this result were: Nikkal Enabel (14 infrastructures in Senegal); AJUMJUP (four infrastructures in Burkina Faso); and *Etat Civil* GN (one infrastructure in Guinea). Nikkal Enabel and *Etat Civil* GN supported the renovation of civil registry offices in Senegal and Guinea to improve access to basic civil documents (e.g. birth certificates and identification documents). In many cases, these are required to access other public services. In Burkina Faso, AJUMJUP, which aims to improve access to and efficiency of the justice system, supports the development of military justice in the country. A key element of these efforts is to develop and strengthen the judicial military police (*gendarmérie préventive*) to ensure the rule of law in the military's fight against terrorism and organised crime. In this context, the project has helped build four infrastructures for the judicial military police.

Governance-related trainings, reaching 1,025 people in S1 2024, also focused predominantly on the judiciary and security forces (indicator 4.2). In Burkina Faso, PARJI and AJUMJUP trained 571 prosecutors, judges, judicial police officers, court clerks, and other legal officers. In Ghana, Border

¹ BF-11-02: *Appui au renforcement de la justice militaire et de la justice de proximité pour lutter contre l'impunité au Burkina Faso.*

² BF-11-01: *Projet d'appui au renforcement de la justice pour lutter contre l'impunité.*

³ ML-06-02: *Programme d'Appui au Renforcement de la Sécurité Mali.*

⁴ NE-06-09: *Renforcement du Dispositif de Promotion et Protection des Droits Humains (RDPPDH) au Niger.*

⁵ NE-06-08: *Programme d'appui à la stabilisation de la situation des populations retournées dans leurs villages d'origines dans la région de Diffa.*

⁶ NE-06-07: *Programme d'appui à la stabilisation et la cohésion sociale dans les zones frontalières Est et Sud-Ouest du Niger.*

⁷ SN-07-02: *Programme d'appui au renforcement du système d'information de l'état civil et à la création d'un fichier national d'identité biométrique.*

⁸ SN-07-03: *Programme d'appui au renforcement du système d'information de l'état civil et à la création d'un fichier national d'identité biométrique.*

⁹ REG-23-03: *Appui aux capacités de dialogue et d'actions concertées des Forces de sécurité intérieures dans les environnements de conflictualité et d'insécurité au Burkina Faso, Mali et Niger.*

¹⁰ REG-23-02: *Human rights and international humanitarian law compliance of ISF and support to national human rights institutions and civil society in Chad, Mauritania and Niger.*

¹¹ REG-14-01: *Modernizing and strengthening secure identity chains and documental security.*

¹² REG-03-02: *Appui au renforcement du Système d'Information Policière au Tchad.*

Security GH strengthened accountability and equity among the Ghana Immigration Service (GIS), training 255 GIS officers on internal accountability systems, vetting procedures and gender mainstreaming. Another 61 customs and GIS officers were trained for the establishment of joint mobile teams across Ghanaian security institutions involved in border management.¹

4.2.6. OVERVIEW OF COUNTRIES WITH LIMITED OUTPUTS

In early 2024, the total number of outputs continued to diminish compared to previous years. This reflected the increasing number of programmes closing, as the EUTF's end nears. In some countries, this resulted in few to almost no new outputs. For the countries showing insufficient data to write an entire country section, outputs are provided in the following paragraphs. This includes Chad, Côte d'Ivoire, Guinea, Mauritania, Nigeria and The Gambia.

Chad

Only one of 20 EUTF programmes that implemented activities in Chad remained active in S1 2024. Bab Al Amal² supported dual trainings for 267 individuals (indicator 1.4) and the establishment of a secondary office of the National Support Fund for Vocational Training in the city of Bol (indicator 1.5), western Chad, to support broader access to trainings and skills development. The project was set to conclude in the second half of 2024.

Côte d'Ivoire

In the first half of 2024, three programmes remained active in Côte d'Ivoire: one national programme (*Etat Civil CI*) and two regional programmes (IPDEV2 and ALTP *Golfe de Guinée*). *Etat Civil CI* provided birth certificates to 650 children (300 girls, 350 boys) (indicator 2.2), and supported the training of 341 civil status officers (indicator 4.2) to improve access to civil documentation. The regional programme, ALTP *Golfe de Guinée*, continued to train judicial officers on the legal framework related to trafficking in persons (indicator 3.7). IPDEV2 supported the training and skills development of 24 people (indicator 1.4) and the creation of 19 jobs (indicator 1.1). ALTP *Golfe de Guinée* concluded during the semester, while *Etat Civil CI* and IPDEV2 were scheduled to close by the end of the year.

Guinea

In Guinea, two programmes, *Etat Civil GN* and IPDEV2, continued to produce results in S1 2024. *Etat Civil GN* improved access to basic social benefits by facilitating the registration of civil status events for 132,086 individuals (indicator 2.9). At the same time, the project rehabilitated one civil status administration office (indicator 4.1) and strengthened the capacities of four civil status officers (indicator 2.8). *Etat Civil GN* came to an end during the semester and IPDEV2 was set to conclude at the end of the year.

Mauritania

In Mauritania, POC MR remained the only project implementing activities in the first half of 2024. This national programme focusing on migration management and the fight against migrant smuggling trained 13 individuals (indicator 3.7) in the management of Temporary Assistance Centres for Foreigners, dedicated to the housing and support of migrants and victims of trafficking. The project was scheduled to complete at the end of the year.

Nigeria

In S1 2024, ALTP *Golfe de Guinée* was the last remaining programme implementing activities in Nigeria. The regional programme trained 34 individuals on migration management and protection (indicator 3.7) with a particular focus on human trafficking and migrant smuggling: 20 staff members

¹ In addition, PDU PMM and GESTDOC conducted governance and peace building-related trainings in S1 2024, which were relevant to indicator 4.2, reaching 125 and 13 people, respectively.

² TD-03: *Projet de soutien à l'insertion socio-professionnelle des jeunes tchadiens en situation de vulnérabilité.*

from dedicated rehabilitation centres were trained on the protection and rehabilitation of victims, and 14 on the information-reporting chain. In addition, the programme provided reintegration assistance to four young women (indicator 3.5 bis) and basic social services to four others (indicator 2.2). The project ended during the semester, marking the end of activities in Nigeria.

The Gambia

Make it in The Gambia was the only programme to remain active in The Gambia during the first semester of 2024. The project provided equipment to one MSME (indicator 1.2) and supported the construction of an agri-food platform¹ and the expansion of a TVET centre (indicator 1.5). It concluded at the end of the semester, marking the completion of EUTF-funded activities in The Gambia.


¹ The Jenoi Agric-Food Platform aims to drive economic growth by improving market access for smallholder farmers and offering modern facilities and services for production, storage, processing, and logistics, while promoting business development and job creation.

5. ANALYSIS BY COUNTRY

5.1. BURKINA FASO

5.1.1. BURKINA FASO IN S1 2024

Figure 15. Burkina Faso – Key facts and figures, June 2024



On 17 February 2024, Captain Traoré addressed thousands of supporters in Ouagadougou, claiming credit for reopening schools and facilitating the return of refugees as evidence of success against jihadists.¹ Yet, the security situation worsened as violent attacks increased. Fatalities rose by 25% in the first half of 2024 compared to the second half of 2023, reflecting a surge in violence.² This escalation was tragically seen across the country, including in a particularly brutal series of assaults in February that resulted in the deaths of approximately 170 people across three northern villages in a single day.³ The escalating threats overwhelmed the military response, culminating in a devastating attack in June in Mansila, eastern Burkina Faso, where an estimated 100 soldiers were killed by the Support Group for Islam and Muslims (JNIM).⁴

The military and its auxiliaries have been accused of committing abuses against civilians in the northern regions. In late April, military columns escorting a supply convoy from Dori to Mansila village were alleged to have carried out mass killings of civilians along the route. Journalists and sources within the military have suspected the army of retaliating against the alleged collaboration of civilians with jihadists.⁵ The Volunteers for the Defense of the Homeland (VDP⁶) auxiliaries to the army did little to improve the security situation. While recruitment exceeded targets with 90,000 enlistments in 2022, their combat effectiveness was deemed low. Training, equipment and pay for the VDP were inadequate. Many deserted, with numbers falling to just 30,000 by mid-2024.⁷ Further, the VDP stood accused of

¹ Jeune Afrique, 'Au Burkina Faso, Ibrahim Traoré joue la « souveraineté » face à « l'impérialisme »', 17 February 2024. Retrieved [here](#).

² ACLED, 'ACLED – Explorer', consulted in December 2024. Retrieved [here](#).

³ TV5Monde, 'Burkina Faso : 170 morts en un seul jour dans trois attaques de villages', 3 March 2024. Retrieved [here](#).

⁴ France24, 'Burkina Faso : ce que l'on sait de l'attaque meurtrière de Mansila, près de la frontière nigérienne', 18 June 2024. Retrieved [here](#).

⁵ Jeune Afrique, 'Au Burkina Faso, un nouveau massacre attribué à l'armée', 16 May 2024. Retrieved [here](#).

⁶ Volontaires pour la défense de la patrie.

⁷ France24, 'Au Burkina Faso, des volontaires pour la défense de la patrie désertent', 27 May 2024. Retrieved [here](#).

grave human rights violations – having allegedly committed killings, abused civilians and exacerbated ethnic tensions against the Peul community, whom they accused of aiding armed groups.¹

Irrespective of these shortcomings, Captain Traoré extended his own mandate.² During national deliberations which were largely boycotted by the opposition, the transition period and military regime were extended by five years.³ This aligns with Traoré's increasingly authoritarian trend, restricting civil liberties and targeting dissidents. Since the beginning of his regime, the country has been plagued by waves of abductions of prominent civil society figures. For instance, on 21 February, Bassirou Badjo, member of the protest movement *Balai citoyen* was abducted from his workplace. The organisation reported that individuals claiming to be state security agents conducted the abduction and led him to an undisclosed location.⁴ Similarly, Guy-Hervé Kam, a renowned lawyer and civil society leader was abducted in Ouagadougou in May by individuals posing as members of the security forces. The abduction occurred only shortly after his release from a four-month detention following a first abduction in late January.⁵

On the international front, the military regime maintained a sovereign stance, culminating in Burkina Faso's withdrawal from ECOWAS, along with Mali and Niger.⁶ Instead, Burkina Faso pursued its engagement within the AES⁷ and the three member states announced their intention to discontinue use of the CFA franc.⁸ Relations with France did not see improvement as the junta persistently displayed acts of hostility, including the expulsion of three diplomats in April 2024.⁹ Meanwhile, the junta continued to foster closer ties with Russia, in particular through military cooperation, as Russia extended its influence by deploying an increasing number of military instructors to Burkina Faso.¹⁰ This strengthened relationship was further evidenced by Russia's delivery of 25,000 tonnes of wheat to Burkina Faso, a strategic move amidst the country's chronic food insecurity, likely intended to solidify its political standing.¹¹

Food security improved but remained critical in the first half of 2024. According to the *Cadre Harmonisé* analysis, 2.7 million people would face food insecurity (IPC Phase 3 or higher) during the lean season (June-August),¹² compared to 3.3 million during the same period in 2023.¹³ As of 30 June, fewer than 30% (810,000) of those experiencing food insecurity had received assistance. The number of IDPs remained substantial and reached 2.1 million in June 2024, largely fleeing conflict-affected areas in the north and east of the country.¹⁴

¹ CGRA, 'Situation sécuritaire – Burkina Faso', 17 September 2024. Retrieved [here](#).

² Jeune Afrique, 'Au Burkina Faso, le régime de transition prolongé de cinq années', 26 May 2024. Retrieved [here](#).

³ Ibid.

⁴ VOA, 'Enlèvement d'une figure de la société civile burkinabè', 22 February 2024. Retrieved [here](#).

⁵ Jeune Afrique, 'Au Burkina Faso, Guy-Hervé Kam libéré et... immédiatement enlevé', 30 May 2024. Retrieved [here](#).

⁶ BBC, 'Ecowas: Niger, Mali and Burkina Faso quit West African bloc', 28 January 2024. Retrieved [here](#).

⁷ TV5Monde, 'Alliance des États du Sahel : un projet de confédération entre le Burkina Faso, le Mali et le Niger', 15 February 2024. Retrieved [here](#).

⁸ Jeune Afrique, 'Sortir du franc CFA ? Le pari risqué du Burkina Faso, du Niger et du Mali', 15 February 2024. Retrieved [here](#).

⁹ Le Monde, 'Trois diplomates français expulsés du Burkina Faso pour « activités subversives »', 18 April 2024. Retrieved [here](#).

¹⁰ VOA, 'Lavrov annonce une "augmentation" du nombre d'instructeurs russes au Burkina Faso', 5 June 2024. Retrieved [here](#).

¹¹ BBC, 'Burkina Faso thanks Russia for 'priceless gift' of wheat', 27 January 2024. Retrieved [here](#).


¹² Cadre Harmonisé, 'Résultats de l'analyse de la situation actuelle et projetée de l'insécurité alimentaire aiguë', 16 March 2024. Retrieved [here](#).

¹³ Cadre Harmonisé, 'Résultats de l'analyse de l'insécurité alimentaire et nutritionnelle aiguë', 20 March 2023. Retrieved [here](#).

¹⁴ OCHA, 'Burkina Faso: Aperçu de la situation humanitaire (au 30 Juin 2024)', 29 July 2024. Retrieved [here](#).

5.1.2. EUTF IN BURKINA FASO

Figure 16: EUTF portfolio in Burkina Faso, June 2024^{1,2}



The EUTF has contracted EUR 190.1M in Burkina Faso. Most funds (69%) went towards governance and conflict prevention programmes (SO4). Resilience programmes (SO2) received 16% of funding, employment and livelihoods programmes (SO1) 11%, and the remainder (4%) supported migration-related programmes (SO3). As of the end of June 2024, 99.5% of the budget had been spent.

The EUTF has funded 10 programmes in Burkina Faso since its launch. Five focused on governance and conflict prevention (SO4 – *Justice BF*³, *PEV*, *ProGEF*⁴, *Protection BF*⁵ and *PUS BF*⁶). Three targeted job creation (SO1 – *Emploi BF*⁷, *Stabilisation Séno*⁸ and *TUUMA*⁹). One programme aimed to increase community resilience (SO2 – *Résilience BF*¹⁰) and one programme supported migration management (SO3 – the *EU-IOM JI Burkina Faso*¹¹).

In S1 2024, two national programmes, Justice BF and PEV, were still active. PEV concluded in April and Justice BF is expected to conclude in October 2024. In addition, three regional programmes

¹ Calculations for the spending chart assume that projects evenly distribute budget spending across years of implementation.

² This data only refers to nationally contracted programmes and excludes regional level programmes implemented in the country.

³ BF-11: *Appui à la justice au Burkina Faso pour renforcer la lutte contre l'impunité au travers d'une justice plus accessible et efficace.*

⁴ BF-03: *Programme d'appui à la gestion intégrée des frontières au Burkina Faso.*

⁵ BF-07: *Protection des jeunes dans les zones à risque au Burkina Faso à travers l'éducation et le dialogue.*

⁶ BF-09: *Appui budgétaire pour la mise en œuvre du Programme d'Urgence Sahel du Burkina Faso.*

⁷ BF-05: *Programme d'appui à l'Emploi dans les zones frontalières et périphériques.*

⁸ BF-02: *Insertion et Stabilisation Socio-Économique des Jeunes et Femmes dans la Province du Séno.*


⁹ BF-06: *Appui à la compétence professionnelle, l'entrepreneuriat et l'emploi des jeunes et des femmes dans les régions rurales du Burkina Faso.*

¹⁰ BF-01: *Programme "LRRD" de renforcement de la résilience des communautés vulnérables à l'insécurité alimentaire et nutritionnelle dans les zones frontalières septentrionales au Burkina Faso.*

¹¹ BF-04: *Renforcement de la gestion et de la gouvernance des migrations et le retour et la réintégration durable au Burkina Faso.*

(IPDEV¹, PDU² and Security G5 Sahel³) implemented activities in the country in S1 2024. All will close by the end of 2024.

Figure 17: Selected EUTF outputs in Burkina Faso, June 2024



Addressing persistent food challenges in Burkina Faso

Burkina Faso faces deep-rooted food challenges stemming from a combination of geographic, climatic and agricultural conditions. Its Saharan location is characterised by an arid climate and highly variable rainfall, making agriculture extremely vulnerable to recurrent droughts and floods. The low soil fertility, exacerbated by land degradation, limits agricultural productivity. Climate change is worsening the situation, as rising temperatures affect crop yields and extreme weather events are increasing in number and intensity.⁴ Further, the predominance of subsistence farming, using traditional techniques that tend to be less efficient and a lack of crop diversification, renders households particularly susceptible to environmental shocks and fluctuating harvests, thereby contributing to structural food insecurity.⁵ Since 2018, this already fragile situation has been exacerbated by a major security crisis. Armed conflicts have interrupted farming activities in many regions and created a large-scale need for food assistance among millions of displaced people without resources.

¹ REG-11: *Soutenir les entrepreneurs et les petites PME en Afrique de l'Ouest.*

² REG-18: *Programme d'urgence pour la stabilisation des espaces frontaliers du G5 Sahel.*

³ REG-23: *Appui aux forces de sécurité des pays membres de G5 Sahel pour la lutte contre l'impunité et le renforcement de leurs liens avec les populations.*


⁴ IED Africa, 'Changement climatique et agriculture durable au Burkina Faso', June 2016. Retrieved [here](#).

⁵ CCAFS, 'Burkina Faso | Research program on Climate Change, Agriculture and Food Security', 18 November 2020. Retrieved [here](#).

portion of their income gathering necessary documents and providing personal data to the court.¹ The quality of decisions rendered by the courts may be further compromised by the lack of specialised training for lawyers and judges. For instance, it has been noted that the rate of appeals deemed inadmissible by the Court of Appeal exceeds 50%, indicating shortcomings in case preparation and presentation. Additionally, the law permits any lawyer, even those without adequate specialisation, to plead before the court, potentially impacting the quality of legal debates.²

To address these problems, PARJI, implemented by Enabel, aimed to improve the criminal justice system by accelerating the processing of pending cases. The project focused particularly on cases related to terrorism and violations of international humanitarian law, while ensuring equitable access to justice for all. The project relied on the training of justice officials to strengthen the judicial system and enhance its efficiency and sustainability. During the first half of 2024, PARJI trained 490 magistrates across 11 regions of the country (indicator 4.2). Key activities included practical workshops for justice officials to improve communication and collaboration within the criminal justice chain; training for judicial police officers on identifying, supporting, and interviewing victims of gender-based violence; and training for judicial actors on land-related issues.

Figure 19: EUTF indicator 4.2, in Burkina Faso, June 2024



5.1.2. BURKINA FASO AND THE EUTF COMMON OUTPUT INDICATORS


Table 2: EUTF common output indicators for Burkina Faso, June 2024

EUTF Indicator	2016-2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023	S1 2024	Total	Evolution
1.1 Number of direct jobs created or supported	2,277	2,414	6,151	1,447	3,971	1,377	482	18,120	
1.2 Number of MSMEs created or supported	55	200	1,854	634	472	112	15	3,342	
1.3 Number of people assisted to develop income-generating activities	4,475	12,644	4,640	4,259	5,047	10,676	40,190	81,931	
1.4 Number of people benefiting from professional training (TVET) ...	956	5,747	4,195	11,642	5,090	9	30	27,669	
1.5 Number of industrial parks and/or business infrastructure constructed...	3	14	19	18	2	4	25	85	
2.1 Number of local development plans directly supported	0	33	18	0	0	1	0	52	
2.1 bis Number of social infrastructure built or rehabilitated	522	1,445	386	858	595	351	51	4,208	
2.2 Number of basic social services delivered	98,553	58,101	4,405	6,273	46,043	7,655	7,002	228,032	
2.3 Number of people receiving nutrition assistance	282,181	100,124	26,270	140,916	275,715	184,121	22,066	1,031,393	
2.4 Number of people receiving food security-related assistance	150,574	217,432	173,568	192,255	242,776	36,358	21,815	1,034,778	
2.5 Number of institutions that adopt local disaster risk reduction strategies	23	71	4	41	1	0	2	142	
2.6 Hectares of agricultural and pastoral ecosystems where sustainable...	1,402	1,003	625	462	380	507	2	4,380	
2.7 Number of people reached by sensitisation campaigns on resilience...	341,434	524,022	234,888	237,126	375,556	576,440	76,881	2,366,347	
2.8 Number of staff from local authorities and basic service providers trained...	7,354	11,919	11,016	3,439	3,873	529	164	38,294	
2.9 Number of people having access to improved basic services	333,002	383,674	65,694	62,732	193,848	120,707	30,606	1,190,263	
3.2 Number of migrants in transit, refugees/asylum seekers and IDPs protected...	190	442	1,736	12,389	16,747	0	0	31,504	
3.3 Number of potential migrants, reached by information campaigns on migration	9,018	27,040	13,248	20,794	63,812	2,160	0	136,072	
3.4 Number of voluntary returns supported	1,635	1,260	5,683	64	0	0	0	8,642	
3.5 Number of returning migrants benefiting from post-arrival assistance	1,580	822	662	476	0	0	0	3,540	
3.5 bis Number of returning migrants benefiting from reintegration assistance	1,244	258	242	535	171	0	0	2,460	
3.7 Number of individuals trained on migration management	0	0	30	1,145	208	28	0	1,411	
3.10 Number of people benefiting from legal migration and mobility programmes	2	23	16	6	0	0	0	47	
3.11 Number of awareness-raising events on migration	20	68	0	15	7	1	0	111	
4.1 Number of infrastructures supported to strengthen governance	3	0	1	16	8	3	4	35	
4.1 bis Number of equipment provided to strengthen governance	924	9	1,210	10,944	1,212	140	245	14,684	
4.2 Number of staff trained on governance, conflict prevention and human rights	994	1,667	1,436	6,845	4,577	3,379	696	19,584	
4.3 Number of people participating in conflict prevention...	3,283	83,035	2,069,905	198,892	372,425	1,472,420	131,126	4,331,086	
4.6 Number of strategies, laws, policies and plans developed...	7	138	123	255	86	32	5	646	
5.1 Number of multi-stakeholder groups and learning mechanisms formed...	91	430	380	356	94	40	6	1,397	
5.2 Number of planning, monitoring and/or learning tools set up...	70	184	615	1,241	458	131	0	2,699	
5.3 Number of field studies, surveys and other research conducted	13	45	4	24	26	24	23	159	
5.4 Number of regional cooperation initiatives created, launched or supported	10	1	4	15	0	0	0	30	
6.1 Number of pandemic-related supplies provided	0	0	302,840	0	0	0	0	302,840	
6.2 Number of people directly benefiting from COVID-19 activities	0	0	8,509	0	0	0	0	8,509	

5.2. GHANA

5.2.1. GHANA IN S1 2024

Figure 20: Ghana – Key facts and figures, June 2024



In the first half of 2024, the Government of Ghana's ongoing efforts at macroeconomic stabilisation yielded initial results with respect to inflation, fiscal balance and GDP growth. Since 2023, a tightened monetary policy and currency stabilisation have gradually reduced inflation in Ghana from an average of 40% in 2023 to an estimated average of 23% for 2024.¹ However, sustaining disinflation remained challenging given that the Ghanaian cedi depreciated by about 17% between January and June 2024 as a result of a strengthened United States dollar.² Fiscal consolidation efforts aimed to broaden the tax base and to strengthen tax compliance. Key measures to achieve these objectives included conducting audits of large taxpayers, improving property tax collection, and strengthening taxation on foreign income earned by Ghanaians.³ As a result, the 2024 primary balance – the difference between the government's revenues and its non-interest expenditures – was expected to reach 0.5% of GDP in 2024 and 1.5% in 2025, up from -4.1% in 2021.⁴ Moreover, GDP growth in the first half of 2024 reached 5.9%, an increase of 3.1 percentage points compared to the first half of 2023.⁵ These positive trends, particularly the mitigated inflation, have contributed to a decline in acute food insecurity (IPC Phase 3 or higher) during the first half of 2024: between January and May, food insecurity decreased by 21% compared to the same period in 2023 (from 1,456,098 to 1,152,381 people).⁶ Nonetheless, the adverse effects of the current economic crisis remained severe: compared to pre-crisis levels, food insecurity remained high⁷ and poverty was expected to continue to increase until 2025, before gradually starting to decline in 2026.⁸

¹ World Bank, 'Ghana Macro Poverty Outlook', October 2024. Retrieved [here](#).

² World Bank, '8th Ghana Economic Update', June 2024. Retrieved [here](#).

³ IMF, 'Second Review under the Extended Credit Facility', July 2024. Retrieved [here](#).

⁴ World Bank, 'Ghana Macro Poverty Outlook', October 2024. Retrieved [here](#).

⁵ Ibid.

⁶ *Cadre Harmonisé* and IPC estimations for West and Central Africa, June 2024. Retrieved [here](#). Another important reason was the above-average cereal output of the harvesting season in the second half of 2023 (FAO, 'GIEWS Country Brief: The Republic of Ghana', 2 September 2024. Retrieved [here](#)).

⁷ On average, 100,666 people faced food insecurity between January–May 2017 and January–May 2019 (phase 3-5), compared with 1,152,381 people during the same period in 2024 (*Cadre Harmonisé* and IPC estimations for West and Central Africa, June 2024. Retrieved [here](#)).

⁸ According to World Bank forecasts, the share of Ghanaians living under the international poverty rate (USD 2.15 per day) will increase from 29.4% in 2023 to 30.8% in 2024 and 31.5% in 2025, before starting to decrease to 30.6% in 2026 (World Bank, 'Ghana Macro Poverty Outlook', October 2024. Retrieved [here](#)).

The country also made important progress towards comprehensive debt restructuring. In 2023, the government had already concluded the Domestic Debt Exchange Programme, replacing local currency bonds by new bonds with longer maturities and lower interest rates.¹ Although the agreement led to an increase in non-performing loans and capital shortfalls, the domestic financial sector has stabilised since, as banks started implementing recapitalisation plans supported by the Ghana Financial Stability Fund and the World Bank.² In January 2024, the government reached an agreement in principle with the official international creditors under the G20 Common Framework for Debt Treatments, according to which USD 5.4 billion of bilateral debt should be restructured. This agreement was formalised in June 2024 through a Memorandum of Understanding between the Government of Ghana and the Official Creditor Committee.³ Finally, in March, the government agreed with its external commercial creditors to work on potential debt restructuring scenarios for USD 13 billion of international bonds.⁴ As a result of the concluded debt restructuring processes⁵, public debt was projected to decrease from 92.7% of GDP in 2022 to 82.5% in 2024 and 79.5% in 2025.⁶

Meanwhile, refugees from Burkina Faso arriving in northern Ghana continued to raise concerns. In response to the increasing number of refugees fleeing from the central Sahel into coastal countries, UNHCR, WFP, IOM and UNICEF published the Gulf of Guinea Joint Response Plan in February 2024. According to the chapter on the response in Ghana, an estimated 15,000 people seeking refuge from jihadist violence had crossed the border from Burkina Faso into Ghana's Upper East and Upper West regions as of December 2023.⁷ Although the plan projected that the number of refugees and asylum seekers from Burkina Faso would reach 28,000 by the end of 2024, UNHCR data suggested that the number had increased only slightly by June 2024.⁸ Nevertheless, managing the refugee movement still posed significant challenges in terms of protection and integration. Data collected during the registration process under the Ghana Refugee Board indicated many in need of special protection: 58% of the 4,105 refugees and asylum seekers registered until June 2024 in the Upper East and Upper West regions were minors and 60% were women.⁹ Despite the efforts of Ghanaian authorities to accommodate refugees, particularly within the two established reception centres, discriminatory practices against Fulani refugees continued, according to media reports: after the expulsion of at least 250 Burkinabe Fulani in 2023,¹⁰ the Ghana Refugee Board had reportedly still not registered any arriving Fulani as of April 2024.¹¹ Fulani, which make up around 1% of the population in Ghana, are often stigmatised as sympathisers of militant Islamist groups and therefore perceived as a security risk.¹²

¹ Business Insider Africa, 'Half of Ghana's \$7 Billion government debt has been erased', 31 July 2023. Retrieved [here](#).

² IMF, 'Second Review under the Extended Credit Facility', July 2024. Retrieved [here](#).

³ World Bank, 'Ghana Macro Poverty Outlook', October 2024. Retrieved [here](#).

⁴ Reuters, 'Exclusive: Ghana, bondholders kick off formal talks on \$13 bln debt restructuring', 14 March 2024. Retrieved [here](#).

⁵ The projections take into account the results of the domestic debt exchange and of the bilateral debt restructuring process but not of the ongoing commercial debt restructuring.

⁶ IMF, 'Second Review under the Extended Credit Facility', July 2024. Retrieved [here](#).

⁷ UNHCR, WFP, IOM, UNICEF, 'Gulf of Guinea Joint Response Plan for refugees, asylum-seekers, internally displaced persons, and host communities: Ghana Planned Response', 18 March 2024. Retrieved [here](#).

⁸ According to UNHCR data, Ghana hosted 22,950 refugees and asylum seekers in December 2023 and 23,230 refugees and asylum seekers in June 2024 (UNHCR, 'Regional Bureau for West and Central Africa: Overview – Forcibly Displaced and Stateless Persons. December 2023', 20 January 2024. Retrieved [here](#); and: UNHCR, 'Regional Bureau for West and Central Africa: Overview – Forcibly Displaced and Stateless Persons. June 2024', 20 July 2024. Retrieved [here](#)).

⁹ UNHCR, 'Ghana: Monthly Statistics: As of 30 June 2024', 16 July 2024. Retrieved [here](#).


¹⁰ Foreign Policy, 'Could Ghana Be Jihadists' Next Target?', 14 May 2024. Retrieved [here](#).

¹¹ The New Humanitarian, 'Ghana accused of expelling Fulani asylum seekers from Burkina Faso', 18 April 2024. Retrieved [here](#).

¹² Foreign Policy, 'Could Ghana Be Jihadists' Next Target?', 14 May 2024. Retrieved [here](#).

5.2.2. THE EUTF IN GHANA

Figure 21: EUTF portfolio in Ghana, June 2024^{1,2}




The EUTF has contracted two programmes in Ghana, amounting to EUR 24.6M. Of the funds received, 80% has been allocated to the employment-related GrEEn programme (SO1³) and 20% to the migration-related Border Security GH programme (SO3). Both programmes implemented activities in S1 2024 and were scheduled to end in December 2024. As of June 2024, an estimated 94% of the EUTF-contracted budget in Ghana had been spent. In addition to these two national programmes, six regional programmes and one national programme of Burkina Faso have implemented activities in Ghana since the start of the EUTF. Two of them were still active in S1 2024 (IPDEV2 and ALTP *Golfe de Guinée*) and both reported results in Ghana in S1 2024.

¹ Calculations for the spending chart assume that projects evenly distribute budget spending across years of implementation.

² This data only refers to nationally contracted programmes and excludes regional level programmes implemented in the country.

³ GH-02: Boosting green employment and enterprise opportunities in Ghana.

Figure 22: Selected EUTF outputs in Ghana, June 2024




Climate-resilient infrastructure

In S1 2024, GrEEn UNCDF supported the construction of 19 social infrastructures to improve climate-resilient economic development (indicator 2.1 bis). Climate change in Ghana has been an important driver of rising average temperatures, changing rainfall patterns and extreme weather events, such as floods and droughts. Over the next two decades, average annual temperatures are expected to increase by 1.2–1.5°C in the country, compared to a decade ago. Rainfall will likely decrease in Ghana's south-western regions while it will likely increase in the northern half of the country. Overall, climate change is expected to reduce crop yields, for example through shorter growing seasons and more extreme weather events.¹ In light of this, GrEEn UNCDF assisted local authorities in developing and operationalising performance-based climate resilience grants to realise local infrastructure projects. Based on district-specific vulnerability assessments and local adaptation planning, 19 climate-resilient infrastructures were built in the first half of 2024, some of them co-financed by the districts. The infrastructures, which included mechanised boreholes, drains, market pavements, footbridges, open market sheds, and school rehabilitations, were estimated to benefit 193,217 people (indicator 2.9). Since its start, the project has supported the construction or rehabilitation of 58 climate-resilient infrastructures in ten districts in the Ashanti and Western regions.

¹ World Bank, 'Ghana's climate vulnerability profile', May 2024. Retrieved [here](#).

Figure 23: EUTF indicator 2.1 bis, in Ghana, June 2024



1,014 people benefitted from the cash-for-work scheme implemented for the construction of these infrastructures, corresponding to the equivalent of 145 full-time jobs for one year (indicator 1.1). Cash-for-work beneficiaries, selected in the second half of 2023, received a short-term training in early 2024 in preparation for the construction work. Beneficiaries included 851 women (84%) and 163 men (16%), 120 (12%) of whom were returnees. Together with the 663 workers involved in the previous cycle of climate-resilient infrastructure development, GrEEn UNCDF has thus reached 1,677 cash-for-work beneficiaries since its beginning. The cash-for-work scheme implemented by the project have contributed to the 15,322 jobs created or supported in Ghana through the EUTF since its launch.

5.2.3. GHANA AND THE EUTF COMMON OUTPUT INDICATORS


Table 3: EUTF common output indicators for Ghana, June 2024

EUTF Indicator	2016-2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023	S1 2024	Total	Evolution
1.1 Number of direct jobs created or supported	0	0	2	2,132	4,463	8,552	173	15,322	
1.2 Number of MSMEs created or supported	0	0	5	131	823	1,269	0	2,228	
1.3 Number of people assisted to develop income-generating activities	0	0	84	16,635	164,345	124,838	6,230	312,132	
1.4 Number of people benefiting from professional training (TVET) ...	0	5	618	3,018	11,801	2,997	0	18,439	
2.1 Number of local development plans directly supported	0	0	0	10	0	0	0	10	
2.1 bis Number of social infrastructure built or rehabilitated	0	0	0	12	0	29	19	60	
2.2 Number of basic social services delivered	0	0	0	62	198	285	0	545	
2.7 Number of people reached by sensitisation campaigns on resilience...	0	0	0	0	160,000	12,507	0	172,507	
2.9 Number of people having access to improved basic services	0	0	0	90,156	0	120,151	193,217	403,524	
3.1 Number of projects and initiatives supported by diaspora members	0	0	0	3	2	0	0	5	
3.2 Number of migrants in transit, refugees/asylum seekers and IDPs protected...	0	0	5	7	0	0	0	12	
3.3 Number of potential migrants, reached by information campaigns on migration	3,164	25,290	826,213	3,708	303	70,819	450	929,947	
3.4 Number of voluntary returns supported	0	0	5	17	0	0	0	22	
3.5 Number of returning migrants benefiting from post-arrival assistance	843	298	753	185	11	0	0	2,090	
3.5 bis Number of returning migrants benefiting from reintegration assistance	177	268	444	657	83	20	0	1,649	
3.6 Number of institutions strengthened on migration management	0	0	2	2	1	13	0	18	
3.7 Number of individuals trained on migration management	0	0	235	519	468	203	16	1,441	
3.10 Number of people benefiting from legal migration and mobility programmes	5	88	64	64	4	0	0	225	
3.11 Number of awareness-raising events on migration	29	57	203	34	11	182	2	518	
4.1 bis Number of equipment provided to strengthen governance	0	0	31	0	70	1,024	166	1,291	
4.2 Number of staff trained on governance, conflict prevention and human rights	140	40	49	805	127	37	316	1,514	
4.3 Number of people participating in conflict prevention...	0	0	0	16	40	16	0	72	
4.6 Number of strategies, laws, policies and plans developed...	0	0	0	1	0	4	37	42	
5.1 Number of multi-stakeholder groups and learning mechanisms formed...	0	0	19	68	71	56	0	214	
5.2 Number of planning, monitoring and/or learning tools set up...	0	0	2	10	15	3	0	30	
5.3 Number of field studies, surveys and other research conducted	0	0	13	4	40	21	0	78	
5.4 Number of regional cooperation initiatives created, launched or supported	1	0	0	3	1	1	0	6	
6.1 Number of pandemic-related supplies provided	0	0	32,000	0	0	0	0	32,000	
6.2 Number of people directly benefiting from COVID-19 activities	0	0	7,000	182,763	0	0	0	189,763	
6.3 Number of entities benefiting from COVID-19 activities	0	0	10	10	0	0	0	20	

5.3. MALI

5.3.1. MALI IN S1 2024

Figure 24: Mali – Key facts and figures dashboard, June 2024



In the first months of 2024, the Malian transition authorities continued to affirm their strong desire for sovereign management of internal affairs. On 25 January, authorities terminated with immediate effect the Algiers Agreement, which had been in place since 2015 to define the terms of peace and reconciliation with the CMA in northern Mali.¹ Three days later, after months of increased tension with ECOWAS and the creation of the AES in September 2023, Mali, along with Burkina Faso and Niger, decided to leave the organisation. The three Sahel states accused ECOWAS of diverging from the ideals of its founding fathers and of Pan-Africanism and accused it of being influenced by foreign powers. They also described the organisation as failing to provide support in the fight against terrorism and imposing what they considered 'unfair' sanctions.² Citing grounds of 'public order', the Malian authorities announced in April the suspension of all activities of political parties and activities 'of a political nature' conducted by associations.³ This decision followed a series of repressive measures against associations earlier in 2024, mainly targeting individuals and organisations voicing critique towards the authorities or calling for the restoration of constitutional order and the organisation of civil elections.⁴

Despite the formal end of the transition period in March 2024, transitional authorities stayed in power,⁵ retrospectively legitimised by the conclusions of the inter-Malian dialogue. In January, Assimi Goïta announced a 'direct inter-Malian dialogue for peace and reconciliation', aimed at enhancing national ownership of the peace process and eliminating the roots of community and intercommunity conflicts.⁶ With plans to gather participants at communal, regional, and national levels, the discussions primarily focused on peace and national reconciliation, while also addressing issues such as the economy, sustainable development, security, and geopolitics.⁷ Held from 13 April to 10 May, the dialogue led to recommendations which considerably undermined the alleged objective of

¹ RFI, 'Mali: la junte au pouvoir annonce la «fin avec effet immédiat» de l'accord d'Alger', 25 January 2024. Retrieved [here](#).

² RFI, 'Le Burkina Faso, le Mali et le Niger se retirent de la Cédéao', 28 January 2024. Retrieved [here](#).

³ CIVICUS, 'Mali: Military authorities suspend activities of political parties and associations; several CSOs dissolved', 3 July 2024. Retrieved [here](#).

⁴ Human Rights Watch, 'Mali : la junte suspend les partis et les associations politiques', 12 April 2024. Retrieved [here](#).

⁵ RFI, 'Mali: la période de transition se termine officiellement mais les autorités restent en place', 26 March 2024. Retrieved [here](#).

⁶ Wathi, 'Les défis d'un dialogue inclusif dans un contexte de conflictualité au Mali', 10 May 2024. Retrieved [here](#).


⁷ Anadolu Ajansı, 'Mali : les termes de référence du dialogue inter-malien remis au chef de la Transition', 5 March 2024. Retrieved [here](#).

developing new approaches to peace and reconciliation in the country. Two recommendations drew particular attention: one called for extending the transition period from three to five years before holding democratic elections, and the other proposed amending Article 9 of the Transition Charter to allow President Assimi Goïta to run in the upcoming presidential election.¹ The AU Peace and Security Council expressed concern over the lack of inclusivity of the dialogue.² Malian authorities asserted their commitment to prioritising a national and inclusive approach to the peace process, as opposed to the 2015 peace agreement signed under international mediation.³ However, the absence of the CMA and other key opposition groups in the dialogue, in response to the suspension of activities of political parties and associations, appeared to undermine this commitment.

Amid these political developments, Mali continued to face socio-economic challenges exacerbated by insecurity and conflict. In April, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) approved USD 120 million in emergency financing in response to the exogenous shock Mali's economy had recently faced – including the consequences of Russia's war in Ukraine, the Red Sea shipping blockade, and a regional funding squeeze. This financial assistance was intended to 'support the provisions of food and targeted cash transfers to those facing acute food insecurity'. The funds were also meant to cover expenditures on 'education, shelter, non-food items, and access to clean water, health and sanitation facilities'.⁴ In the first months of the year, Mali also saw an increase in refugees, especially coming from Burkina Faso. From November 2023 to June 2024, the number of refugees in the country increased by 29,009, including 26,897 Burkinabe. At the same time, while internal displacements decreased, 78,980 new Malians crossed borders seeking asylum in other countries, bringing the total number of Malian refugees in asylum countries to 288,471.⁵

5.3.2. THE EUTF IN MALI

Figure 25: EUTF portfolio in Mali, June 2024^{6,7}



¹ Institut d'études de sécurité, 'La stabilité au Mali passe par un dialogue national plus inclusif', 15 July 2024. Retrieved [here](#).

² RFI, 'Le Conseil paix et sécurité de l'UA dénonce la détérioration de la sécurité et de l'espace civique au Sahel', 5 June 2024. Retrieved [here](#).

³ RFI, 'Dialogue inter-Maliens : Assimi Goïta fustige l' "agenda" de la communauté internationale', 6 May 2024. Retrieved [here](#).

⁴ IMF, 'IMF Staff Reaches Staff-Level Agreement with Mali on Rapid Credit Facility and Completes 2024 Article IV Missions', 30 April 2024. Retrieved [here](#).

⁵ Compared numbers from: UNHCR, 'Mali: Situation of Refugees, Internally Displaced Persons and Returnees', November 2023 and June 2024. Retrieved [here](#) and [here](#).

⁶ Calculations for the spending chart assume that projects evenly distribute budget spending across years of implementation.

⁷ This data only refers to nationally contracted programmes and excludes regional level programmes implemented in the country.

The EUTF has contracted EUR 285.3M in Mali. In June 2024, 96% of this budget had been spent. Most of the funds were allocated to governance and conflict-prevention (SO4 – 41%), followed by resilience (SO2 – 32%), economic and employment opportunities (SO1 – 22%) and migration-related programmes (SO3 – 5%).

Since its launch, the EUTF has funded 13 national programmes in Mali, focusing on good governance and security (PAECSIS¹, PARSEC², POC Mali³, PST-ML, SDNM 2⁴), resilience (ADEL⁵, KEY⁶, PROJES, RELAC II⁷), developing economic and employment opportunities (*Diaspora Mali*⁸, EJOM⁹, PAFAM¹⁰) and improving migration management (Migration ML¹¹). In addition, 17 regional programmes have implemented activities in Mali.

In the first half of 2024, four national programmes (*Diaspora Mali*, PARSEC, PROJES, PST-ML) and three regional programmes (IPDEV2, PDU, Security G5 Sahel¹²) were still active. *Diaspora Mali* and PROJES ended during the semester. IPDEV2, PDU and Security G5 Sahel will continue implementing activities into the second half of 2024, and PARSEC and PST-ML until 2025.

¹ ML-08: *Programme d'appui au fonctionnement de l'état civil au Mali: appui à la mise en place d'un système d'information sécurisé.*

² ML-06: *Programme d'Appui au Renforcement de la Sécurité dans les régions de Mopti et Gao et à la gestion des zones frontalières.*

³ ML-13: *Partenariat Opérationnel Conjoint, de lutte contre l'immigration irrégulière, le trafic de migrants et la traite des êtres humains en République du Mali.*

⁴ ML-04: *Sécurité et Développement au Nord du Mali – phase 2.*

⁵ ML-12: *Appui au Développement Economique Local et à la prévention des conflits dans les régions de Tombouctou et Gao.*

⁶ ML-01: *Programme de renforcement de la résilience des communautés, des ménages et des individus vulnérables à l'insécurité alimentaire et nutritionnelle au Mali.*

⁷ ML-03: *Relance de l'Economie et Appui aux Collectivités II.*

⁸ ML-05: *Projet d'appui aux investissements de la diaspora malienne dans les régions d'origine.*


⁹ ML-09: *Youth Employment Creates Opportunities At Home in Mali.*

¹⁰ ML-02: *Création d'emplois par l'amélioration de la filière de l'anacarde, afin d'atténuer les causes de l'émigration, dans les régions de Sikasso, Kayes et Koulikoro.*

¹¹ ML-07: *Renforcement de la gestion et de la gouvernance des migrations et le retour et la réintégration durable au Mali.*

¹² REG-23: *Appui aux forces de sécurité des pays membres du G5 Sahel pour la lutte contre l'impunité et le renforcement de leurs liens avec les populations.*

Figure 26: Situation in Mali and EUTF outputs – as of June 2024¹



Continued support against chronic malnutrition and food insecurity

Recent assessments revealed that malnutrition and food insecurity were on the rise in the first half of 2024 in Mali. The latest malnutrition Rapid-SMART survey², conducted in Mali between May and June 2024, revealed that child malnutrition prevalences far exceeded the critical thresholds set by the World Health Organisation (WHO). The survey assessed the prevalence of global acute malnutrition in children aged 6–59 months across seven districts and four IDP sites. Nine of the 11 assessed areas exceeded the WHO's critical threshold of 15% prevalence for acute malnutrition, and eight exceeded the critical threshold of 2% prevalence for severe malnutrition. In the IDP sites in Gao, these rates reached 19% for acute malnutrition – almost double the rate observed in 2023 – and 11% for severe acute malnutrition – up from 4.2% in 2023.^{3,4} Regarding food insecurity, between March and May 2024, 795,583 people were estimated to be in crisis level or worse in Mali, 34,696 more than in the same

¹ Any score below 0.55 is considered low human development. In 2021, Mali's global HDI was 0.428 and the World's HDI was 0.732.

² SMART stands for Standardised Monitoring and Assessment of Relief and Transitions. The SMART Methodology is a standardised, simplified survey methodology designed to aid in the collection of quality, up-to-date data that are necessary for decision-making, and to harmonise methods used for rapid nutrition assessments, especially in emergency settings. Developed by a consortium of humanitarian organisations and UN agencies, it is widely used by NGOs, UN agencies, governments and researchers.


³ Compared numbers from: République du Mali, UNICEF, 'Enquête SMART-Rapide' 2023 and 2024. Retrieved [here](#) and [here](#).

⁴ Note that the two surveys were not conducted during the same period: the 2023 survey was conducted in March, while the 2024 survey was conducted in early June, which is closer to the lean season, when food insecurity and malnutrition can present greater challenges.

period in 2023.¹ Malnutrition and food security are closely linked, as both phenomena share common underlying drivers and food security is a key contributing factor to malnutrition.

In the first half of 2024, EUTF-funded programmes provided nutrition assistance to 80,661 people in Mali (indicator 2.3). This is more than the total for 2023 and represents the highest value for a semester of implementation since 2019. The assistance consisted of two main types of support. PDU PROGRESS improved malnutrition diagnosis by training 58,722 female heads of household on the MUAC measurement method, most of them in Mopti region. Two other projects focused on preventing and treating malnutrition. PST-Resilience provided vouchers or cash transfers to prevent malnutrition through food supplementation, benefitting 16,364 pregnant and breastfeeding women as well as 4,776 children aged 6–23 months. At the same time, PDU PARIC treated 799 children, 467 girls and 332 boys, for severe acute malnutrition in the Mopti region. In addition to providing nutrition assistance, PST-Resilience built the capacities of 3,870 staff members from local civilian institutions (indicator 2.8). These capacity-building activities aimed to strengthen resilience to food insecurity shocks and crises.

Figure 27: EUTF indicator 2.3, in Mali, June 2024



Resilience amid increased insecurity

The EUTF continued to strengthen community resilience and conflict prevention capacities in a context characterised by insecurity and violence. In early 2024, Security G5 Sahel provided legal assistance to 6,050 people (indicator 2.2). These activities were led by the Malian civil society

¹ Compared numbers from: Cadre Harmonisé, 'Mali – Résultats de l'analyse de la situation de l'insécurité alimentaire aiguë actuelle et projetée', March 2023 and March 2024. Retrieved [here](#) and [here](#).

organisation (CSO), *DEME SO*¹, which provided legal information, orientation, council and services to victims or potential victims of human rights violations. Following the same approach of empowering local actors to build resilience and strengthen conflict prevention, PDU PROGRESS supported intercommunity reconciliation activities led by young leaders, with 158 people (55 women, 103 men) participating in these conflict prevention and peace-building activities in the region of Mopti (indicator 4.3).

5.3.3. MALI AND THE EUTF COMMON OUTPUT INDICATORS

Table 4: EUTF common output indicators for Mali, June 2024


EUTF Indicator	2016-2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023	S1 2024	Total	Evolution
1.1 Number of direct jobs created or supported	0	2,198	1,307	2,927	1,231	75	411	8,149	
1.2 Number of MSMEs created or supported	950	1,664	718	575	37	5	2	3,951	
1.3 Number of people assisted to develop income-generating activities	18,499	30,552	20,574	57,010	10,577	13,366	0	150,578	
1.4 Number of people benefiting from professional training (TVET) ...	3,689	5,511	5,998	9,231	1,627	949	4	27,009	
1.5 Number of industrial parks and/or business infrastructure constructed ...	7	58	19	40	0	0	0	124	
2.1 Number of local development plans directly supported	0	0	0	0	9	0	0	9	
2.1 bis Number of social infrastructure built or rehabilitated	246	241	120	739	99	227	53	1,727	
2.2 Number of basic social services delivered	3,813	2,344	1,290	11,210	222,836	11,179	6,050	258,722	
2.3 Number of people receiving nutrition assistance	108,815	190,481	63,346	13,693	56,763	76,058	80,661	589,817	
2.4 Number of people receiving food security-related assistance	38,880	69,426	56,314	22,701	154,143	113,682	29,682	484,828	
2.5 Number of institutions that adopt local disaster risk reduction strategies	10	2	0	0	0	0	0	12	
2.6 Hectares of agricultural and pastoral ecosystems where sustainable...	5,133	4,736	4,152	17,512	12	4	186	31,734	
2.7 Number of people reached by sensitisation campaigns on resilience...	31,343	176,408	314,206	545,698	2,032,047	175,054	67,238	3,341,994	
2.8 Number of staff from local authorities and basic service providers trained...	633	5,124	364	935	2,078	4,302	3,870	17,306	
2.9 Number of people having access to improved basic services	1,749,378	284,844	236,546	205,672	299,153	42,117	1,935	2,819,644	
3.1 Number of projects and initiatives supported by diaspora members	0	0	21	9	15	0	2	47	
3.2 Number of migrants in transit, refugees/asylum seekers and IDPs protected...	6,088	3,021	1,692	18,191	17,299	71	0	46,362	
3.3 Number of potential migrants, reached by information campaigns on migration	0	91,476	42,729	218,702	72,561	543	0	426,011	
3.4 Number of voluntary returns supported	1,885	981	349	321	0	0	0	3,536	
3.5 Number of returning migrants benefiting from post-arrival assistance	9,612	6,212	2,292	2,879	0	0	0	20,995	
3.5 bis Number of returning migrants benefiting from reintegration assistance	2,046	4,364	3,111	3,723	20	0	0	13,264	
3.6 Number of institutions strengthened on migration management	3	19	18	23	0	0	0	63	
3.7 Number of individuals trained on migration management	25	0	281	1,044	70	21	0	1,441	
3.10 Number of people benefiting from legal migration and mobility programmes	2	14	6	9	0	0	0	31	
3.11 Number of awareness-raising events on migration	0	0	31	33	5	0	0	69	
4.1 Number of infrastructures supported to strengthen governance	3	2	3	2	2	1	0	14	
4.1 bis Number of equipment provided to strengthen governance	837	6	1,318	4,777	2,726	757	0	10,421	
4.2 Number of staff trained on governance, conflict prevention and human rights	610	1,930	1,074	4,012	4,377	15,203	0	27,206	
4.3 Number of people participating in conflict prevention...	265	1,342	1,934	14,043	142,498	29,796	77,218	267,096	
4.6 Number of strategies, laws, policies and plans developed...	37	381	133	288	399	15	0	1,253	
5.1 Number of multi-stakeholder groups and learning mechanisms formed...	12	26	54	257	148	0	0	497	
5.2 Number of planning, monitoring and/or learning tools set up...	17	16	808	426	1,008	6	1	2,282	
5.3 Number of field studies, surveys and other research conducted	34	26	14	395	400	198	3	1,070	
5.4 Number of regional cooperation initiatives created, launched or supported	8	0	6	2	2	9	6	33	
6.1 Number of pandemic-related supplies provided	0	0	102,641	0	0	0	0	102,641	

¹ Deme so means 'the house of help' in Bambara, one of the national languages of Mali.

5.4. NIGER

5.4.1. NIGER IN S1 2024

Figure 28: Niger – Key facts and figures, June 2024



In January 2024, Niger, along with Mali and Burkina Faso, decided to leave ECOWAS, amid tensions between the military rulers in Niger and ECOWAS.¹ After the 2023 military coup in Niger, ECOWAS advocated for a military intervention to restore civilian rule in the country. However, the junta was able to progressively gain legitimacy on the international stage through negotiations and diplomatic manoeuvring. Most significantly, the regime gained recognition from both the United Nations and ECOWAS in December 2023.² At the start of 2024, negotiations continued with ECOWAS to address the crisis, aided by intensive mediation of the Togolese President, Faure Gnassingbé. Nevertheless, on 28 January, all three AES countries declared that they would leave ECOWAS. In response, ECOWAS announced the lifting of all sanctions imposed on Niger and offered further negotiations aimed at a return of the three countries.³ Instead, the AES fostered their internal relationship, including by discussing steps to leave the CFA franc in favour of a common AES currency.⁴

In addition, the junta pursued a rupture with Niger's historical security partners. In March 2024, the rupture with the United States was formalised as the junta officially denounced the presence of American troops on Nigerien soil. General Tiani designated the United States military presence as undemocratic and a violation of Niger's sovereignty. The decision to cut security ties with Washington came after the junta had already severed relations with former colonial power, France, in 2023. Tensions were exacerbated by the junta's connections to Moscow and by American accusations that Niger had signed a uranium deal with Iran.⁵ In May, however, the United States accepted to withdraw its troops by 15 September 2024.⁶

Despite the junta's consolidation of power, the pressure emanating from Niger's economic situation increased. In S1 2024, the country continued to suffer from high levels of public debt, spiralling further into a vicious cycle because the country was obliged to take out loans at ever higher

¹ BBC, 'Ecowas: Niger, Mali and Burkina Faso quit West African bloc', 28 January 2024. Retrieved [here](#).

² Jeune Afrique, 'L'ONU reconnaît la junte de Tiani comme autorité légitime du Niger', 19 December 2024. Retrieved [here](#).

³ France 24, 'La levée des sanctions contre le Niger, un net changement de braquet pour la Cédéao', 26 February 2024. Retrieved [here](#).

⁴ Al Jazeera, 'Debate on ditching CFA begins as Burkina Faso, Mali, Niger forge new path', 23 February 2024. Retrieved [here](#).

⁵ Jeune Afrique, 'Entre le Niger et les États-Unis, les raisons de la rupture', 19 March 2024. Retrieved [here](#).

⁶ CNN, 'US reaches agreement with Niger to withdraw military forces by September 15', 19 May 2024. Retrieved [here](#).

interest rates. Since the coup, the country has already defaulted several times on its debt.¹ The giant oil pipeline constructed between Niger and Benin was supposed to provide a breath of fresh air by earning the country almost USD 2 million per day. Although operations started in March 2024,² they were halted shortly thereafter, in early June, as a result of tensions between the two countries.³ Although ECOWAS sanctions were lifted, allowing trade to resume between the members states and Niger, Tiani refused to reopen borders as he accused Benin of hosting 'French bases' that allegedly trained 'terrorists' seeking to harm Niger's interests. France and Benin strongly denied these claims. In retaliation, the President of Benin, Patrice Talon, prohibited the transportation of Nigerien oil from Benin's ports, maintaining pressure on the junta.⁴ As of the end of June 2024, the borders remained closed, and the pipeline inoperative, inflicting high costs on both countries.⁵ The pipeline also faced physical damage linked to the violent conflict in Niger. On 12 June, six Nigerien soldiers who monitored the pipeline were killed in an attack. Furthermore, on the night of 16 to 17 June, vandals significantly damaged an important section of the pipeline. The Patriotic Front for the Liberation of Niger (FPLN), a rebel movement formed in August 2023 following the July 26 coup, claimed responsibility for the attack. Its leader, Mahamoud Sallah, then declared taking up arms to demand the 'liberation' of the ousted president Bazoum.⁶

The first half of the year saw a worsening of the humanitarian situation in Niger, with increased violence, food insecurity, and displacement mainly driven by conflict. In the first six months of 2024, 892 people died in violent events, compared to 729 in the preceding six months.⁷ This surge in violence exacerbated the challenges faced by the country. Most notably, food security in Niger has deteriorated since the start of 2024. The *Cadre Harmonisé* data indicated that 3.4 million individuals would face food insecurity (IPC Phase 3 or higher) during the lean season (June–August).⁸ This marks a substantial increase (40%) compared to the same period last year, when 2.4 million people experienced food insecurity.⁹ Displacement has also increased. Between December 2023 and June 2024, an additional 72,153 IDPs were reported, bringing the total to 407,430.¹⁰ The repeal of the law criminalising assistance to illegal migration in Agadez in November 2023 has triggered increased internal and external migration flows. The number of registered individuals leaving Niger rose sharply, from 79,291 in November 2023 to 134,202 in May 2024,¹¹ largely due to increased migration flows between Niger and Libya. This combined effect of violence, food insecurity, and increased internal displacement, contributed to sustain the humanitarian crisis in the country.

¹ Jeune Afrique, 'Étranglé par ses dettes, le Niger fait un retour risqué sur le marché régional', 30 April 2024. Retrieved [here](#).

² RFI, 'Le pipeline Niger-Bénin officiellement mis en service', 2 March 2024. Retrieved [here](#).

³ TV5 Monde, 'Niger : Niamey a fermé ses vannes de pétrole vers le Bénin', 14 June 2024. Retrieved [here](#).

⁴ Jeune Afrique, 'Entre le Niger et le Bénin, la frontière de la discorde', 15 May 2024. Retrieved [here](#).

⁵ Jeune Afrique, 'Bénin-Niger : les millions de dollars perdus dans la crise entre Talon et Tiani', 21 Juin 2024. Retrieved [here](#).

⁶ TV5 Monde, 'Le Niger confirme "le sabotage" d'une partie d'un oléoduc par un groupe rebelle', 22 June 2024. Retrieved [here](#).

⁷ ACLED, 'ACLED – Explorer', consulted in December 2024. Retrieved [here](#).

⁸ *Cadre Harmonisé*, 'Résultats de l'analyse de la situation actuelle et projetée de l'insécurité alimentaire aiguë', 16 March 2024. Retrieved [here](#).


⁹ *Cadre Harmonisé*, 'Résultats de l'analyse de l'insécurité alimentaire et nutritionnelle aiguë', 20 March 2023. Retrieved [here](#).

¹⁰ Compared numbers from: UNHCR, 'Monthly Statistics', December 2023 and June 2024. Retrieved [here](#) and [here](#).

¹¹ Compared numbers from: IOM, 'Niger – Rapport sur le suivi des flux de populations', November 2023 and May 2024. Retrieved [here](#) and [here](#).

5.4.2. THE EUTF IN NIGER

Figure 29: EUTF portfolio in Niger, June 2024^{1,2}



The EUTF has allocated EUR 290.6M to programmes in Niger. The bulk of these funds went to governance and conflict prevention (SO4 – 41%), followed by employment (SO1 – 30%), migration (SO3 – 19%), and resilience programmes (SO2 – 10%).

Since the launch of the EUTF, four programmes have been dedicated to governance and conflict prevention (AJUSEN³, ECI⁴, ECI *Terrorisme*⁵, EP-GNN⁶), six to employment (A-FIP⁷, *Emploi Niger*⁸, PAIERA⁹, *Pôles Ruraux*¹⁰, ProEmploi, *Stabilisation Agadez*), three to resilience (Kallo Tchidaniwo¹¹, *Résilience ASP*, Shimodu¹²) and three to migration (EU-IOM JI Niger MRRM¹³, EU-IOM JI Niger SURENI¹⁴ and ProGEM¹⁵). In addition to these national programmes, 17 regional programmes have implemented activities in Niger.

In S1 2024, three national programmes continued to implement activities in Niger. *Stabilisation Agadez* focused on employment stabilisation efforts under SO1, *Résilience ASP* built community

¹ Calculations for the spending chart assume that projects evenly distribute budget spending across years of implementation.

² This data only refers to nationally contracted programmes and excludes regional-level programmes implemented in the country.

³ NE-06: *Reconstruction de l'État au Niger en complément du SBCII en préparation / Appui à la Justice, Sécurité et à la Gestion des Frontières au Niger.*

⁴ NE-05: *Création d'une Equipe Conjointe d'Investigation (ECI) pour la lutte contre les réseaux criminels liés à l'immigration irrégulière, la traite des êtres humains et le trafic des migrants.*

⁵ NE-15: *Création d'une Equipe Conjointe d'investigation (ECI) pour la lutte contre les réseaux criminels liés au terrorisme.*

⁶ NE-16: *Soutien à la création d'un escadron polyvalent de la Garde Nationale du Niger.*

⁷ NE-04: *Appuyer la formation et l'insertion professionnelle des jeunes filles et garçons des régions d'Agadez et Zinder en vue de contribuer au développement socioéconomique de ses deux régions.*

⁸ NE-11: *Création d'emplois et d'opportunités économiques à travers une gestion durable de l'environnement dans les zones de transit et départ au Niger.*

⁹ NE-08: *Plan d'Actions à Impact Économique Rapide à Agadez.*

¹⁰ NE-03: *Projet d'appui aux filières agricoles dans les régions de Tahoua et Agadez.*

¹¹ NE-09: *Soutien à la résilience institutionnelle et communautaire dans la région de Diffa.*

¹² NE-10: *Projet intégré d'appui à la résilience des populations vulnérables réfugiées, déplacées, retournées et hôtes de la région de Diffa, Niger.*


¹³ NE-01: *Migrant Resource and Response Mechanism (MRRM).*

¹⁴ NE-07: *Renforcement de la gestion et de la gouvernance des migrations et le retour durable au Niger.*

¹⁵ NE-02: *Renforcement de la gestion durable des conséquences des flux migratoires au Niger.*

resilience under SO2, and AJUSEN conducted conflict prevention activities under SO4. Both *Résilience* ASP and AJUSEN will pursue their activities and close at the end of the second semester of 2024, while *Stabilisation Agadez* concluded its activities in April. Two regional programmes were active during the semester (IPDEV2 and PDU) and will continue their activities in the second semester, concluding by the end of 2024.

Figure 30: Selected EUTF outputs in Niger, June 2024



Relieving communities in Tillabéri through IGAs

The Tillabéri region in south-western Niger, bordering Burkina Faso, is a highly vulnerable area facing significant environmental and economic challenges.¹ This area experiences year-to-year variability in rainfall, characterised by extended periods of droughts followed by floods. Moreover, there is a noticeable increase in maximum temperatures, presenting additional challenges for agriculture and access to water resources. With 80% of the region's population engaged in agriculture, the economic outlook for the area is therefore discouraging in both the short and medium terms.²


The **PROGRESS** project, operated by *Action contre la Faim* as a part of the PDU programme, delivers relief to parts of the region's population. In the first half of 2024, the project provided basic equipment to 10,062 vulnerable people, allowing them to develop IGAs (indicator 1.3). The provision of these kits followed comprehensive needs assessments conducted with the participation of the beneficiaries and the project team. Additionally, the team evaluated the socio-economic viability of the kits, in collaboration with technical services, vocational training centres, and local cooperatives. Beneficiaries underwent training focusing on association management, marketing strategies,

¹ ACLED, 'ACLED – Explorer', consulted in December 2024. Retrieved [here](#).

² RNCA – Niger, 'Profil des risques climatiques – Tillabéri, Niger', 28 October 2023. Retrieved [here](#).

negotiation skills, and basic accounting principles. The kits provided comprehensive support for various small businesses, encompassing livestock, materials for carting businesses, and starter kits for a range of other small-scale enterprises. At each distribution, recipients were instructed on the appropriate utilisation of the kits and encouraged sound household financial management.

Figure 31: EUTF indicator 1.3, in Niger, June 2024



Strengthening migration observatories in Zinder


The region of Zinder, located in the south-east of the country, is a key hub for migratory flows, particularly from the south to the north. It holds two major entry and exit points in the country, Dan Barto and Magaria, through which many individuals travel further north, aiming to reach North Africa and eventually Europe.¹ Zinder faces significant challenges linked to the diverse movements of migrants – returning, transiting, arriving, and departing – which strain the capacity of both the region and the municipalities to provide basic services and promote local development for their residents.²

To enhance the response to these complex dynamics, the PROSTARAZ project has focused on strengthening existing migration observatories in the region. These observatories are tasked with supporting communities in analysing the situation and defining and prioritising necessary support measures to address migration challenges. The project aimed to enhance the observatories' functionality, making them effective monitoring tools for territorial, particularly communal, authorities. By monitoring and analysing the migration situation, authorities are able to plan support actions and ensure their long-term sustainability. In the first half of 2024, the project trained 109 new members of the observatories (indicator 3.7). An initial project analysis revealed that these observatories were previously male-dominated and lacked inclusivity. The project consequently focused on training women. Of the 109 members trained during this period, 80 were women.

¹ IOM, 'Niger — Rapport sur le suivi des flux de populations 77', June 2024. Retrieved [here](#).

² EUTF, 'A Zinder, le FFU améliore l'accès des populations résidentes et des migrants aux services et infrastructures de base pour favoriser le vivre-ensemble', 28 February 2020. Retrieved [here](#).

Figure 32: EUTF indicator 3.7, in Niger, June 2024



5.4.3. NIGER AND THE EUTF COMMON OUTPUT INDICATORS


Table 5: EUTF common output indicators for Niger, June 2024

EUTF Indicator	2016-2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023	S1 2024	Total	Evolution
1.1 Number of direct jobs created or supported	4,831	4,488	8,100	5,443	11,802	3,438	1	38,104	
1.2 Number of MSMEs created or supported	91	127	399	708	690	364	0	2,379	
1.3 Number of people assisted to develop income-generating activities	5,940	5,332	8,623	12,989	22,578	14,729	10,129	80,321	
1.4 Number of people benefiting from professional training (TVET) ...	6,110	7,875	3,757	4,788	5,509	1,799	329	30,167	
1.5 Number of industrial parks and/or business infrastructure constructed...	0	212	72	32	22	6	0	344	
2.1 Number of local development plans directly supported	26	29	21	13	42	26	0	157	
2.1 bis Number of social infrastructure built or rehabilitated	62	852	749	941	182	57	19	2,863	
2.2 Number of basic social services delivered	1,020	6,340	5,254	7,086	1,439	385	0	21,524	
2.3 Number of people receiving nutrition assistance	0	184	3,455	35,614	45,016	82,671	23,183	190,123	
2.4 Number of people receiving food security-related assistance	70,386	123,818	125,031	99,141	86,255	7,763	0	512,394	
2.5 Number of institutions that adopt local disaster risk reduction strategies	0	0	0	1	14	6	0	21	
2.6 Hectares of agricultural and pastoral ecosystems where sustainable...	4,680	82,858	13,467	6,542	53,965	27,883	0	189,394	
2.7 Number of people reached by sensitisation campaigns on resilience...	0	3,669	196,270	369,839	244,266	78,449	1,057	893,560	
2.8 Number of staff from local authorities and basic service providers trained...	651	1,426	1,316	4,035	1,275	976	199	9,878	
2.9 Number of people having access to improved basic services	144,191	266,542	211,714	281,618	176,677	56,632	0	1,137,374	
3.2 Number of migrants in transit, refugees/asylum seekers and IDPs protected...	54,592	7,335	8,585	16,696	12,146	3,649	0	103,003	
3.3 Number of potential migrants, reached by information campaigns on migration	263,488	199,745	8,806	59,872	136,332	22,677	0	690,920	
3.4 Number of voluntary returns supported	24,718	14,165	9,014	6,697	193	420	0	55,207	
3.5 Number of returning migrants benefiting from post-arrival assistance	2,624	1,450	351	139	0	0	0	4,564	
3.5 bis Number of returning migrants benefiting from reintegration assistance	30	134	1,192	822	344	0	0	2,522	
3.6 Number of institutions strengthened on migration management	45	14	10	5	0	3	4	81	
3.7 Number of individuals trained on migration management	639	756	291	227	291	41	109	2,364	
3.8 Number of people of concern benefiting from evacuation and resettlement...	2,915	1,395	583	465	18	0	0	5,376	
3.10 Number of people benefiting from legal migration and mobility programmes	0	6	4	6	0	0	0	16	
3.11 Number of awareness-raising events on migration	9,233	2,996	22	0	0	0	0	12,251	
4.1 Number of infrastructures supported to strengthen governance	10	0	0	14	0	1	0	25	
4.1 bis Number of equipment provided to strengthen governance	489	1,082	1,433	10,871	5,728	1,744	0	21,347	
4.2 Number of staff trained on governance, conflict prevention and human rights	1,607	1,784	781	2,541	2,835	640	0	10,189	
4.3 Number of people participating in conflict prevention...	395,666	78,363	46,964	186,684	280,380	36,912	353,530	1,378,498	
4.6 Number of strategies, laws, policies and plans developed...	7	40	16	24	77	22	0	186	
5.1 Number of multi-stakeholder groups and learning mechanisms formed...	46	40	88	102	36	93	0	405	
5.2 Number of planning, monitoring and/or learning tools set up...	48	58	451	175	511	2	0	1,245	
5.3 Number of field studies, surveys and other research conducted	29	17	13	24	52	21	0	156	
5.4 Number of regional cooperation initiatives created, launched or supported	8	7	5	7	10	0	0	37	
6.1 Number of pandemic-related supplies provided	0	0	3,713	1,696	0	0	0	5,409	
6.2 Number of people directly benefiting from COVID-19 activities	0	0	867	3,913	0	0	0	4,780	
6.3 Number of entities benefiting from COVID-19 activities	0	0	20	0	0	0	0	20	

5.5. SENEGAL

5.5.1. SENEGAL IN S1 2024

Figure 33: Senegal – Key facts and figures, June 2024



After the postponement of the presidential election and discussions regarding the validation of candidacies, the Senegalese finally voted for the opposition candidate, **Bassirou Diomaye Faye, as their new president during the March 2024 election.** In February 2024, former president, Macky Sall, announced the indefinite postponement of the presidential election just a few days before the originally scheduled date of 25 February. This decision, unprecedented in the country's history, sparked intense reactions from the opposition, civil society, and citizens, and was ultimately annulled by the Constitutional Council.¹ The vote finally took place on 24 March.² Bassirou Diomaye Faye, Secretary General of Ousmane Sonko's opposition party PASTEF, who had been nominated as the candidate to replace Sonko after the latter had been declared ineligible, was elected in the first round with 54% of the votes.^{3,4} The initial months of his presidency were marked by strong measures to address economic challenges and enhance transparency and regularity in public affairs management. The government announced a decrease in the prices of essential goods (e.g. sugar, rice, oil and bread).⁵ The president also ordered a series of audits and controls on the utilisation of human and budgetary resources across ministries, as well as on several contracts concluded by the former government with foreign private companies⁶, and the authorisations for construction projects along the capital's coastline.⁷

Following a favourable review of IMF-supported programmes and financial agreements in Senegal, and a disbursement of USD 279 million in December 2023,⁸ the IMF adopted a more cautious stance towards the country's economic situation in the first quarter of 2024. After demonstrating resilience in 2023, with over 4% growth, the Senegalese economy experienced weaker-

¹ Aljazeera, 'Senegal president Sall to implement court order revising election delay', 16 February 2024. Retrieved [here](#).

² TV5 Monde, 'Présidentielle du 24 mars au Sénégal: comment le report a été partiellement mis en échec', 8 March 2024. Retrieved [here](#).

³ France24, 'Sénégal: comment expliquer la victoire de Bassirou Diomaye Faye dès le premier tour?', 26 March 2024. Retrieved [here](#).

⁴ BBC, 'Election présidentielle 2024 au Sénégal: Bassirou Diomaye Faye élu au premier tour avec 54,28 %', 24 March 2024. Retrieved [here](#).

⁵ Ministère des Finances et du Budget, 'Baisse des prix au Sénégal: liste des mesures prises par le Gouvernement', June 2024. Retrieved [here](#).

⁶ RFI, 'Sénégal: le nouveau président multiplie les mesures de vérification des comptes publics', 18 April 2024. Retrieved [here](#).


⁷ RFI, 'Sénégal: pourquoi les autorités suspendent des constructions au bord de l'océan à Dakar', 30 April 2024. Retrieved [here](#).

⁸ IMF, 'IMF Country Report No. 23/435 – Senegal', December 2023. Retrieved [here](#).

than-expected growth at the beginning of the year, primarily due to the political turmoil surrounding the presidential election's postponement and delays in the launch of gas production. The IMF thus urged the newly elected authorities to 'take ambitious measures to streamline fiscal spending and improve expenditure efficiency'.¹ Nevertheless, real growth was expected to reach 6.1% (below the initial forecast of 7.1%) and inflation was expected to ease during the year, falling between 1 and 3%, down from 5.9% in 2023.² On 11 June, Senegal became a commercial oil and gas producer with the start of exploitation of the offshore Sangomar field, located off the coast of the capital, Dakar.³ The launch is expected to be followed by the start of another project before the end of the year, namely the Grand Tortue/Ahmeyim (GTA) project, located at the border with Mauritania. This new industry is seen as a key opportunity to accelerate the country's economic growth, and support energy source diversification and autonomy. While some of these gas reserves are intended to be exported to Europe in liquid form, another part will be used to supply Senegalese businesses and households, whose electricity was sourced at 80% from imported petroleum products.⁴

5.5.2. THE EUTF IN SENEGAL

Figure 34: EUTF portfolio in Senegal, June 2024^{5,6}



The EUTF has contracted EUR 163.8M in Senegal. Of these funds, the bulk has been allocated to employment-related programmes (SO1 – 55%), followed by governance and conflict-prevention (SO4 – 22%), migration (SO3 – 17%) and resilience (SO2 – 6%). In June 2024, 97% of the EUTF-contracted budget in Senegal had been spent.

¹ RFI, 'Après une visite au Sénégal, le FMI inquiet pour l'économie malgré une croissance en 2023', 5 May 2024. Retrieved [here](#).

² World Bank, 'Senegal – Country overview', 17 October 2024. Retrieved [here](#).

³ TV5 Monde, 'Le Sénégal devient officiellement producteur de pétrole', 19 June 2024. Retrieved [here](#).

⁴ RFI, 'Sénégal: de grandes attentes entourent la future production du gaz naturel', 3 April 2024. Retrieved [here](#).


⁵ Calculations for the spending chart assume that projects evenly distribute budget spending across years of implementation.

⁶ This data only refers to nationally contracted programmes and excludes regional level programmes implemented in the country.

Since its launch, the EUTF has funded nine programmes in Senegal, focusing on: job creation (DES¹, PASPED², PACERSEN³, PARERBA⁴); resilience (RSAN Matam⁵, Yellitaare⁶); migration management (Migration SN); and good governance and security (*Etat Civil* SN, POC⁷). In addition to national programmes, several regional programmes have implemented activities in Senegal, namely ARCHIPELAGO⁸ and IPDEV2 supporting economic development (SO1), Erasmus+ West Africa⁹ and Protection West Africa¹⁰ supporting migration management (SO3), and GAR-SI¹¹ supporting good governance and security (SO4).

In early 2024, three programmes remained active in Senegal: two national programmes (*Etat Civil* SN, Migration SN), and one regional programmes (IPDEV2). Migration SN and IPDEV2 will continue to implement activities into the second half of 2024 and *Etat Civil* SN until 2025.

Figure 35: Selected EUTF outputs in Senegal, June 2024



¹ SN-04: Développer l'emploi au Sénégal: renforcement de la compétitivité des entreprises et de l'employabilité dans les zones de départ.

² SN-09: Programme de contraste à la migration illégale à travers l'appui au Secteur Privé et à la création d'emplois au Sénégal.

³ SN-05: Projet d'Appui à la réduction de la migration à travers la Création d'Emplois Ruraux au Sénégal.

⁴ SN-08: Projet d'Appui à la Réduction de l'Émigration rurale et à la Réintégration dans le Bassin Arachidier par le développement d'une économie rurale sur base des périmètres irrigués.

⁵ SN-03: Projet de renforcement de la sécurité alimentaire et nutritionnelle dans la région de Matam.

⁶ SN-01: Résilience des populations les plus vulnérables face aux crises nutritionnelles et alimentaires dans les zones de départ de Podor, Ranérou, Matam et Kanel.

⁷ SN-10: Partenariat Opérationnel Conjoint (POC) de lutte contre l'émigration irrégulière, la traite et le trafic de migrants au Sénégal.

⁸ REG-15: ARCHIPELAGO: an African-European TVET initiative.

⁹ REG-05: Erasmus+ in West Africa and the Horn of Africa.

¹⁰ REG-13: Appui à la protection des migrants les plus vulnérables en Afrique de l'Ouest.

¹¹ REG-04: GAR-SI SAHEL (Groupes d'Action Rapides – Surveillance et Intervention au Sahel).

Improved civil status data management

Following the first ever francophone Africa symposium on civil registration held in Dakar in December 2023, the newly elected authorities seemed committed to continue addressing issues related to civil status in S1 2024. Lack of civil registration can constitute an important obstacle to accessing basic rights and services, including education. After their inauguration, the President and Prime Minister decided to allow students without civil status documentation to take the final elementary school exam (CFEE) preceding entry into middle school.¹ This allowed 69,730 pupils without civil status documents to take the exam, 39,404 more than the previous year.² Prime Minister Ousmane Sonko also asked the Minister of National Education to 'establish a system for collecting the identities of students registered for the CFEE exam who lack civil status documents, in order to create a database that can be used to address this issue'.³

In S1 2024, the EUTF-funded Nekkal programme continued its efforts toward the modernisation of the Senegalese civil registration system. Nekkal Civipol 2 trained 422 additional staff members (105 women, 317 men) of civil status centres, on the use of the new national civil status data management application (indicator 2.8). This nationwide application, implemented with EUTF support, aims to unify and replace the diverse systems previously in use across the country. At the same time, Nekkal Enabel – another project under the Nekkal programme – provided 375 items of equipment to civil status centres, including technical equipment and equipment dedicated for archive rooms (indicator 4.1 bis).

5.5.3. SENEGAL AND THE EUTF COMMON OUTPUT INDICATORS

Table 6: EUTF common output indicators for Senegal, June 2024

EUTF Indicator	2016-2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023	S1 2024	Total	Evolution
1.1 Number of direct jobs created or supported	553	2,900	9,181	7,599	3,317	1,585	3	25,117	
1.2 Number of MSMEs created or supported	1,688	1,146	4,278	1,134	901	328	0	9,475	
1.3 Number of people assisted to develop income-generating activities	6,207	7,106	2,788	223	1,391	987	0	18,702	
1.4 Number of people benefiting from professional training (TVET) ...	9,757	7,043	2,583	1,236	12,795	662	0	34,077	
1.5 Number of industrial parks and/or business infrastructure constructed...	0	0	0	0	19	0	0	19	
2.1 Number of local development plans directly supported	6	11	7	0	32	0	0	57	
2.1 bis Number of social infrastructure built or rehabilitated	3	56	13	37	17	4	0	130	
2.2 Number of basic social services delivered	5,378	2,781	304	0	0	0	0	8,463	
2.3 Number of people receiving nutrition assistance	67,575	327,702	168,358	0	53,995	0	0	617,630	
2.4 Number of people receiving food security-related assistance	23,153	21,280	19,857	23,361	4,059	0	0	91,710	
2.5 Number of institutions that adopt local disaster risk reduction strategies	0	40	0	0	0	0	0	40	
2.6 Hectares of agricultural and pastoral ecosystems where sustainable...	23	667	432	525	0	0	0	1,648	
2.7 Number of people reached by sensitisation campaigns on resilience...	42,939	180,400	357,769	100,535	30,904	5,960	0	718,508	
2.8 Number of staff from local authorities and basic service providers trained...	194	1,997	102	28	137	5,260	422	8,140	
2.9 Number of people having access to improved basic services	2,400	10,737	15,933	35,581	45,188	206,896	0	316,735	
3.1 Number of projects and initiatives supported by diaspora members	19	36	15	115	100	11	0	296	
3.2 Number of migrants in transit, refugees/asylum seekers and IDPs protected...	0	8	731	1,478	1,507	161	0	3,885	
3.3 Number of potential migrants, reached by information campaigns on migration	103,918	506,419	142,382	1,133,758	13,157,410	2,754,838	0	17,798,726	
3.4 Number of voluntary returns supported	10	7	119	80	0	0	0	216	
3.5 Number of returning migrants benefiting from post-arrival assistance	2,950	913	521	857	0	0	0	5,241	
3.5 bis Number of returning migrants benefiting from reintegration assistance	288	2,110	16,940	2,316	22	0	0	21,656	
3.6 Number of institutions strengthened on migration management	0	8	0	2	0	0	0	10	
3.7 Number of individuals trained on migration management	0	0	368	303	447	148	0	1,266	
3.10 Number of people benefiting from legal migration and mobility programmes	0	36	50	48	0	0	0	134	
3.11 Number of awareness-raising events on migration	221	73	548	131	28	3	0	1,004	
4.1 Number of infrastructures supported to strengthen governance	0	0	0	2	2	0	14	18	
4.1 bis Number of equipment provided to strengthen governance	34	0	702	278	325	5,156	375	6,870	
4.2 Number of staff trained on governance, conflict prevention and human rights	150	50	141	662	690	67	0	1,760	
4.3 Number of people participating in conflict prevention...	0	0	0	0	30	0	0	30	
4.6 Number of strategies, laws, policies and plans developed...	9	28	10	53	18	26	0	144	
5.1 Number of multi-stakeholder groups and learning mechanisms formed...	0	44	9	27	49	9	0	138	
5.2 Number of planning, monitoring and/or learning tools set up...	8	9	3	5	27	5	0	57	
5.3 Number of field studies, surveys and other research conducted	14	5	16	33	27	13	0	108	
6.1 Number of pandemic-related supplies provided	0	0	84,525	0	0	0	0	84,525	
6.2 Number of people directly benefiting from COVID-19 activities	0	0	251,687	0	0	0	0	251,687	
6.3 Number of entities benefiting from COVID-19 activities	0	0	93	0	0	0	0	93	

¹ Seneplus, 'Le Sénégal veut un état civil moderne et sécurisé', 26 June 2024. Retrieved [here](#).

² Agence de presse sénégalaise, 'CFEE et Entrée en 6e : près de 70 000 candidats sans pièce d'état civil autorisés à concourir', 24 June 2024. Retrieved [here](#).

³ Ibid.


CONCLUSIONS

In the first half of 2024, despite initial signs of a slight economic recovery, the SLC region continued to grapple with political instability and intensified conflict, driving more people into food insecurity and displacement. As of the end of June 2024, the *Cadre Harmonisé* reported a record 52 million food insecure people across the region (IPC Phases 3 or higher)¹, surpassing the previous year's peak of 44.8 million. At the same time, regional displacements continued to increase in the region, reaching 10.1 million people, including both refugees and IDPs, compared to 9.9 million at the end of 2023.

THE EUTF PORTFOLIO IN S1 2024

In S1 2024, the EUTF contracted portfolio in the SLC window remained unchanged, including 213 operational contracts worth EUR 2.2B. The EUTF reached its peak in spending during the first half of 2020, and only 1% of the budget remains to be implemented.

As of June 2024, 184 projects of the 213 contracted were completed. 29 projects will continue to implement activities, mainly focusing on SO4 (45%), followed by SO2 (31%) and SO1 (17%). Only two projects remain active under SO3 (7%). Most of the remaining active projects are projects implemented at the regional scale (40%). At the national level, Niger is the country with the highest number of remaining projects (14%), followed by Mali and Senegal (10% each), Burkina Faso and Ghana (7% each), and Chad, Côte d'Ivoire, Guinea and Mauritania (3% each). Cameroon, Nigeria, and The Gambia have no national projects active remaining.



THE MLS

This report is the outcome of the 14th round of data collection conducted by the MLS team for the EUTF's SLC window.

Data collection for the S1 2024 report began in August 2024 and continued until September 2024. Many IPs also provided the MLS team with qualitative information on programme implementation, which supported the analysis and contextualisation of collected data.

This report includes data from 209 projects, a number that has been gradually increasing: 71 projects had been included in the first report in 2018, 129 in the 2019 annual report, 166 in 2020, 194 in 2021, 205 in 2022, and 207 in the 2023 annual report.

S1 2024 KEY ACHIEVEMENTS

Substantial results continued to be reported against all strategic objectives in S1 2024:

- **Economy and employment:** The EUTF supported the creation of 1,110 jobs in the SLC region in the first half of 2024, for a total of 159,761 jobs created or supported since the beginning of activities (indicator 1.1). During the semester, 56,549 people benefitted from assistance to develop IGAs (indicator 1.3), and 2,686 people benefitted from TVET and/or skills development (indicator 1.4).

¹ *Cadre Harmonisé*, 'Résultats de l'analyse de la situation actuelle et projetée de l'insécurité alimentaire aiguë', 16 March 2024. Retrieved [here](#).

² Estimates based on known contracts' budget, start and end dates. Only contracted and operational projects are included.

Additionally, 22 MSMEs were created or supported in S1 2024 (indicator 1.2). Finally, 28 business and productive infrastructures were built or rehabilitated over the course of the semester (indicator 1.5).

- **Resilience:** EUTF-funded programmes supplied 136,313 people with food security-related assistance (indicator 2.4) and 125,910 beneficiaries with nutrition assistance (indicator 2.3) in S1 2024. EUTF-funded programmes also supported the delivery of 13,706 basic social services (indicator 2.2), and improved access to basic services for 357,844 people (indicator 2.9) during the semester. Further, 138 social infrastructures were built or rehabilitated (indicator 2.1 bis), and 4,659 people were trained to provide better services (indicator 2.8). Finally, 145,176 people were reached by resilience campaigns in S1 2024 (indicator 2.7).
- **Migration:** EUTF-funded programmes provided capacity-building or operational support to 387 staff (indicator 3.7) and four institutions (indicator 3.6) involved in migration management during the first half of 2024. Campaigns on the risks of irregular migration reached 450 migrants and potential migrants (indicator 3.3). EUTF-funded activities also supported four returnees with reintegration assistance (indicator 3.5 bis) and two initiatives overseen by diaspora members (indicator 3.1).
- **Governance, security and conflict prevention:** EUTF-funded programmes supported the drafting of 42 laws, plans and policy documents aimed at improving governance and policy-making efforts in S1 2024 (indicator 4.6). Further, 561,874 individuals participated in peace-building activities centred around conflict prevention and human rights during the semester (indicator 4.3). EUTF-funded programmes also delivered training to 1,370 staff members and key actors involved in social cohesion, peace dynamics and governance (indicator 4.2), including subjects such as justice, civil registration, gender, conflict prevention and human rights. Finally, 19 governance infrastructures were supported (indicator 4.1) and 798 items of equipment (indicator 4.1 bis) were provided to support governance and security in S1 2024.

6. INDEX

6.1. TABLES

Table 1: EUTF common output indicators for all SLC projects, June 2024	20
Table 2: EUTF common output indicators for Burkina Faso, June 2024	47
Table 3: EUTF common output indicators for Ghana, June 2024	53
Table 4: EUTF common output indicators for Mali, June 2024.....	59
Table 5: EUTF common output indicators for Niger, June 2024.....	66
Table 6: EUTF common output indicators for Senegal, June 2024	70

6.2. FIGURES

Figure 1: Contracted budget breakdown by country and Strategic Objective, June 2024	5
Figure 2: Projects and budget covered by the S1 2024 MLS report, June 2024	12
Figure 3: Evolution of projects and budgets covered by the MLS in SLC, June 2024.....	13
Figure 4: EUTF SLC contracted projects by budget and implementation status, June 2024	14
Figure 5: Budget distribution by country and implementing partner, June 2024	15
Figure 6: Contracted budget breakdown by strategic objective, June 2024	16
Figure 7: Main achievements of EUTF-funded programmes in June 2024	19
Figure 8: Strategic Objective 1 dashboard, SLC, June 2024.....	21
Figure 9: Output evolution EUTF indicator 1.1, SLC, June 2024.....	24
Figure 10: Strategic Objective 2 dashboard, SLC, June 2024.....	26
Figure 11: Number of people at stages 3 to 5 of IPC, June 2024	27
Figure 12: Strategic Objective 3 dashboard, SLC, June 2024.....	30
Figure 13: Number of IDPs and refugees, and main migration flows, June 2024	32
Figure 14: SO3 output evolution chart, SLC, June 2024	Error! Bookmark not defined.
Figure 15: Strategic Objective 4 dashboard, SLC, June 2024.....	35
Figure 16: Burkina Faso – Key facts and figures, June 2024	41
Figure 17: EUTF portfolio in Burkina Faso, June 2024.....	43
Figure 18: Selected EUTF outputs in Burkina Faso, June 2024	44
Figure 19: EUTF indicator 2.4, in Burkina Faso, June 2024.....	45
Figure 20: EUTF indicator 4.2, in Burkina Faso, June 2024.....	46
Figure 21: Ghana – Key facts and figures, June 2024	48
Figure 22: EUTF portfolio in Ghana, June 2024.....	50
Figure 23: Selected EUTF outputs in Ghana, June 2024	51
Figure 24: EUTF indicator 2.1 bis, in Ghana, June 2024.....	52
Figure 25: Mali – Key facts and figures dashboard, June 2024.....	54
Figure 26: EUTF portfolio in Mali, June 2024.....	55
Figure 27: Situation in Mali and EUTF outputs – as of June 2024	57
Figure 28: EUTF indicator 2.3, in Mali, June 2024	58
Figure 29: Niger – Key facts and figures, June 2024.....	60
Figure 30: EUTF portfolio in Niger, June 2024.....	62
Figure 31: Selected EUTF outputs in Niger, June 2024	63

Figure 32: EUTF indicator 1.3, in Niger, June 2024	64
Figure 33: EUTF indicator 3.7, in Niger, June 2024	65
Figure 34: Senegal – Key facts and figures, June 2024	67
Figure 35: EUTF portfolio in Senegal, June 2024	68
Figure 36: Selected EUTF outputs in Senegal, June 2024.....	69
Figure 37: Spending of EUTF SLC funds	71